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SURFACE DAMAGES AND THE OIL AND GAS
OPERATOR IN NORTH DAKOTA
WILLIAM P. PEARCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the surface owner of land and the
mineral developer producing oil and gas from the land has always
been a troubled and thorny one, particularly when the surface
owner does not own the oil and gas beneath his property. Much
litigation and many pages of analysis and commentary have been
devoted to the inherent conflicts between the mutual obligations
and expectations of each party in this controversial area.1 At the
heart of the matter is the question of damage to the surface caused,
-B.A., M.S., Ph.D., Northwestern University, 1962, 1964, 1967; J.D., Northwestern
University, 1971; partner in law firm of Pearce, Anderson & Durick, Bismarck, North Dakota.
1. See e.g., Browder, Accommodation of the Conflicting Interests of the Mineral Owner and the Surface
Owner, 25 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 85 (1974); Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees
Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use and Occupy the Surface, 20 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 227 (1975); Lopez,
Upstairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 995
(1980); Manning, Mineral Rights Versus Surface Rights, 2 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 329 (1969); Moses,
Peaceful Coexistence Between Lessor and Lessee Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 38 TUL. L. REv. 341 (1964);
Patton, Recent Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 RocKy MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 19(1973).
The nature of the different interests involved seems to point inevitably to conflict, as one
commentator has observed:
By virtue of the necessary use of the surface to capture and reduce to possession the
underlying minerals, it is plain that at some time or another, if development is had
under the lease, the surface use of the land must inevitably bring about a clash
between the holders of the two estates in the land - and one must yield.
McMahon, Rights and Liabilities with Respect to Surface Usage by Mineral Lessees, 6 INST. ON OIL & GAS L
& TAx'N 231 (1955).
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or alleged to have been caused, by exploration for and development
of the underlying oil and gas resources. 2 Who bears the risk for
such damage and upon what legal theories liability may be
predicated are questions of particular interest in North Dakota in
light of the current high levels of oil and gas activity in the state.
3
The purpose of this Article is to summarize the law of North
Dakota on this question, analyzing the reported cases and
discussing the possible ramifications of the enactment of the Oil
and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act of 1979. 4 It will be
2. This Article deals only with matters relating to oil and gas development. The issues arising in
the context of development of coal and other solid or "hard" minerals are beyond the scope of the
discussion here, although some references will be made to the strip mining of coal. In the case of
minerals such as coal. which are produced by surface strip mining techniques, a number of the
questions that arise are clearly quite different than in the oil and gas situation, so that the applicable
law is not the same. V. KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS 5 10.4 (1954).
The North Dakota Industrial Commission has broad jurisdiction over coal exploration under
chapter 38-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, including the power to require "the plugging,
covering, or reburial in an appropriate manner so as to protect environmental quality, general health
and safety, and economic values, of all holes, pits, or trenches excavated during the course of coal
exploration." N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-12.1-04(2) (Supp. 1981). The state geologist, acting for the
Industrial Commission, "shall require that any lands substantially disturbed" by coal exploration be
reclaimed in accordance with the standards applicable to coal mining, in order to "protect
environmental quality, general health and safety, and economic values." Id. § 38-12.1-04(5).
The actual surface mining of coal subsequent to exploration and the restoration and
reclamation of the surface is extensively regulated by the North Dakota Public Service Commission,
pursuant to chapters 38-14 1 and 38-14.2 of the North Dakota Century Code, for several stated
purposes. one of which is "to ensure the restoration of affected lands designated for agricultural
purposes to the level of productivity equal to or greater than that which existed in the permit area
prior to mining." Id. § 38-14.1-01(5) (1980). For a background discussion of the earlier development
of North Dakota law on surface mining regulation, see Hagen, North Dakota's Surface Mining and
Reclamation Law Will Our Wealth Make Us Poor? 50 N.D.L. REv. 437 (1974). In 1975 the North Dakota
Legislature enacted the Surface Owner Protection Act, chapter 38-18 of the North Dakota Century
Code, providing for payment of monetary damages by a coal developer to the surface owner for loss
of agricultural production caused by mining activity and for moving farm buildings if operations
come within five hundred feet. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-07(1)-(2) (Supp. 1981). The Act also
expressly places the financial obligation for surface reclamation upon the mineral developer. Id. § 38-
18-08(1) (1980). This statute provided a precedent for the Oil and Gas Production Damage.
Compensation Act of 1979, chapter 38-11.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, discussed in section
V ofthis Article. Id. ch. 38-11.1.
Exploration and development of other "hard" minerals, such as uranium and sulphur, is
regulated by the Industrial Commission. Id. ch. 38-12. The Commission has the authority to require
"Iihe reclamation of all land disturbed by operations regulated by [chapter 38-121 to a condition
consistent with prior land use and productive capacity." Id § 38-12-02(1)(e). Although oil and gas
would fit within the definition of "subsurface minerals" in 5 38-12-01(7) of the North Dakota
Century Code ("all naturally occurring elements, and their compounds"), this chapter presumably
is not intended to cover oil and gas, which are treated separately at length in chapter 38-08 of the
North Dakota Century Code. Id. § 38-12-01(7).
Finally, it is of interest to note that the 1981 North Dakota Legislature enacted statutes
regulating geothermal resource development. Id. ch. 38-19 (Supp. 1981). Here also the Industrial
Commission has the authority to require that the operator "restore the surface as nearly as possible
to its original condition and productivity" upon termination of any facility or activity. Id. 5 38-19-
03(1 )(g). One of the declared policies of the geothermal act is to prevent "waste," which is defined to
include activities that would cause "unnecessary or excessive use, or degradation, of land surface."
Id. § 38-19-01, -02(7). In the oil and gas context, "waste" is also prohibited, id. § 38-08-03 (1980),
but "waste" is defined in terms of physical loss ofoil or gas, dissipation of reservoir energy, excessive
production and the like, rather than in terms of damage to the surface. Id. 5 38-08-02 (15).
3. Section 38-08-05 of the North Dakota Century Code requires the issuance of a permit for the
drilling of an oil or gas well. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05 (Supp. 1981). The North Dakota
Industrial Commission issued 1072 drilling permits in 1981, an increase of 39% over the 773 permits
issued in 1980. NORTH DAKOTA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NEWSLETTER 23 (Dec. 1981).
4. N.D. CENT. CODEch. 38-11.1 (1980).
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useful first to review the conceptual nature of the different interests
of the surface owner and the owner of severed minerals and the
respective rights of each. The rights of the oil and gas developer, as
against the interrelated rights of the surface owner, under a typical
oil and gas lease will then be examined, first in general and then as
established under North Dakota law.
I. NATURE OF THE PARTIES' INTERESTS
The term "correlative rights" is frequently used in oil and gas
law, usually in the context of the interrelated rights of a number of
mineral owners to the oil and gas in a common source or "pool"
underlying their lands.5 It may be helpful to extend the concept
here to the case of a surface owner and an owner of the severed oil
and gas interest underlying the surface. Each enjoys certain
corresponding and reciprocal rights and duties, which necessarily
impose limitations upon each other. Hence, their rights and duties
may be said to be "correlative" to each other, though not
necessarily in the sense of being entitled to equal protection or
recognition. 6 It is possible for the surface owner and mineral owner
to be the same person, but the surface damage problem does not
usually arise in that case. If the surface owner also owns the
mineral interests, then he is the lessor when a developer-lessee is
exploring for or producing the oil and gas, and he will have
received an initial bonus consideration for having granted the lease,
as well as delay rentals, or royalties if there is production from his
land. Moreover, by entering into the lease he may be said to have
impliedly authorized the lessee to do such damage to the surface as
is reasonably necessary in the conduct of its operations. I
The surface damage issue usually becomes a serious bone of
contention only in the case in which the surface interest has been
severed from the underlying oil and gas interest, so that the mineral
owner who leases to the developer and reaps the financial reward is
5. E.g., 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.6, at 60.4 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as WILLIAMS & MFYERSj; Kuntz, Correlative Rights of Parties Owning Interests in a Common Source of
Supply of Oil or Gas, 17 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 217 (1966). See generally, Arnstad v. North
Dakota State Indus. Comm'n, 122 N.W.2d 857, 859-61 (N.D. 1963).
6. "Correlative" generally means "Ihiaving a mutual or reciprocal relation, in such sense that
the existence of one necessarily implies the existence of the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 311
(5th ed. 1979). SeeGray, supra note 1, at 232; Patton, supra note 1.
See also Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 138 (N.D. 1979). The court in Hunt Oil
characterized the use of the term "correlative rights" in this sense as "unfortunate" because it might
suggest equality of the surface and mineral interests, as opposed to the traditional dominance of the
mineral estate. Id.
7. Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1956). Such
authorization would bar any recovery for damages, since the lessor has assumed the risk of damage
from operations customary in the industry. Id. See notes 74-75 infra.
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not the same person as the surface owner. The latter normally
receives nothing from mineral production and may feel that he has
somehow been victimized by the whole process. The owner of the
severed surface interest seeking to pursue a damage claim probably
does not stop to ponder the theoretical nature of his interest or to
inquire whether it is in fact an interest that enjoys legal protection
from this kind of damage. Such an analysis, however, is not only
instructive, but also crucial to the manner in which a court must
approach the issue if the surface owner pursues his damage claim to
litigation.
The separation or severance of the surface interest in a tract of
land from the mineral interests in or underlying the land creates a
situation in which at least two persons share in some manner in the
"ownership" of the land, defining the "land" to be the surface and
everything underlying it. 8 It is often said that each has a separate
and distinct property right or estate in the land. 9 Simply to state
that one has a property right in or owns the surface and another the
minerals, however, does not shed any light on their mutual rights
and duties. That question can be clarified only by looking behind
the descriptive words "property" and "ownership."
In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish
between the right of ownership itself and the subject-
matter of that right. . . . It is necessary to realize,
however, that although "property" is often used in this
loose way to refer either to the thing itself or to the rights
in that thing, the concept of ownership itself is quite
distinct from any tangible things to which it may relate,
for it is no more than the expression of a legal relationship
resulting from a set of legal norms.
For this purpose it may be said that ownership is not
a single category of legal "right" but is a complex bundle
of rights whose precise character will vary from legal
system to legal system. 10
8. This Article does not attempt to deal with minerals mined by surface strip mining techniques.
as noted above, and, therefore, there is no need to be concerned with the subtleties of defining the
term "surface." The distinction between "surface" and the shallowest oil and gas producing
formations in North Dakota is well defined.
9. E.g., McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 396 (N.D. 1980). In
McDonald the court observed: "In North Dakota, after a mineral title is severed by reservation, the
surface and minerals are held by separate and distinct titles, and each is a freehold estate of
inheritance,." Id. The result is the same whether the severance is accomplished by reservation or by a
deed ofa mineral interest. See Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 652, 180 N.W. 787,
789 (1920).
10. D. LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAw 319, 323 (1964).
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Thus, "property," as a legal concept, connotes not a thing in
itself' but rather certain rights. These rights are not between the
property owner and some thing or object, but are rights between
the owner and other persons with respect to that thing or object."
This concept of the enjoyment by one person of a certain bundle of
rights in a thing, such as land, enforceable by the sanctions of the
law against other persons, is at the heart of the common law theory
of private property. 12 As a general principal the nature of private
property is the right to exclude others from exercising power or
control over, or enjoying the fruits of, some object or thing. '3
In the context of the surface owner and the owner of severed
oil and gas interests, therefore, the question is what rights does each
possess; that is, what legally protected privileges does the law grant
to each one in the tract of land in question? 4 The idea of separate
sets of rights and separate ownership with respect to the surface and
minerals is a fairly modern concept. The English common law
tradition contemplated that "ownership of land" included
ownership of the surface and everything under it and over it. 1 5 An
exception was made for ownership of precious metals such as gold,
which belonged to the sovereign, who could be said to have
reserved those mineral substances in any grant of rights in land to
11. M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 45 (1933) ("A right is always against one or more
individuals").
12. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 214. 246 (1881). Oliver Wendall Holmes defined a legal
right as follows:
A legal right is nothing but a permission to exercise certain natural powers, and
upon certain conditions to obtain protection, restitution, or compensation by the aid
of the public force. Just so far as the aid of the public force is given a man, he has a
legal right....
But what are the rights of ownership? . . . Within the limits prescribed by polcy.
the owner is allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter
uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such
interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one.
Id.
13. M. COHEN, supra note 11. at 46. Thus. "alny thing, then, is my property if I have the right
to exclude you, at my pleasure, from any use of it. All civil societies must, if perpetual conflict is to be
avoided, regulate the control which diverse persons may exercise over the same object." M. COHEN,
REASON AND LAW 109 (1950).
14. See E. BODENHEINIER .]URISPRUDENCE 312 (rev. ed. 1974). These separate interests provide a
cogent illustration of the inherent function of law as an instrument of social policy "It is one of the
chief functions of the law to adjust and conciliate these various conflicting interests, individual as
well as social. This must be done, in part at least, by the promulgation of general rules assessing the
wseight of various interests and providing standards for their adjustment." Id.
15. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COssMENTARiES *18. As Blackstone stated: "Land hath also, in its
legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards .... Whatever is in a direct
line. between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth, belongs to the owsner of the surface:
as is every day's experience in the mining countries." Id. Ownership was not absolute, however,
since under the tenure theory all land was deemed to be owned by the sovereign, and landowners
held various rights in the land under the-king as their ultimate feudal overlord. L. FRIDMAN., A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAsw 51-52 (1973). For practical purposes, though. tenure in fee simple was
functionally equivalent to ownership in the modern sense. See W. WAtLSH, A HISTORY OF ANcGio
AMIERICAN LAsv 100 (2d ed. 1932).
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private persons.' 6  American law did not recognize inherent
ownership of any severed mineral by the government in private
land, perhaps due in part to the policy of favoring free alienability
of land. 7 Grants of land to individuals or to corporations, such as
the railroads, from the vast domain of public lands in this country
starting in the nineteenth century did not even attempt to sever and
reserve minerals in these public lands. Early in the present century,
however, when it had become apparent that coal, oil and gas, and
other minerals constituted a potentially enormous source of public
wealth, mineral reservations became mandatory in many types of
public land grants so that the surface and mineral ownership began
to be severed in large tracts of land, particularly in the western
United States.' 8 As the practices of reserving minerals in private
land transfers and of separately transferring minerals gained favor,
severed ownership of minerals and surface in land became
common. North Dakota is typical of many western states in having
widespread ownership of severed mineral interests, both private
and governmental. ' 9
Investigation of the relationship between the surface owner
and the owner of these severed mineral interests in North Dakota
16. See Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates - Ri ght to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to
Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411, 412-13 (1974); Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs:
Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 995, 996-97 (1980).
17. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 359. "The dominant idea ofAmerican land law was that
land should be freely bought and sold. For this reason, lawyers, judges and legislatures, in the years
after independence, had gone to great pains to untie the Gordian knots of English land law. " Id.
18. In the pre-Civil War period, so little thought was given to the public mineral wealth that the
federal government actually bought gold and silver taken from public lands by private individuals.
Davis, Expanding the Republic, in THE GREAT REPUBLIC 444 (1977). In modern times the relations
between the surface owner and a mineral developer on lands where the minerals are owned by the
federal government is intermeshed with provisions in various federal statutes governing the grants of
the lands. That is a subject beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Note, Prtection for Surface
Owners qfFederally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 171 (1973). Questions arising
in the context of federally owned coal are discussed in Haughey & Gallinger, Legislative Protection ofthe
Surface Owner in the Surface Mining of Coal Reserved by the United States, 22 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 14'
(1976). Rights to surface use under rinieial reservations in federal statutes governing the patenting
of public lands are discussed in Fleck, Severed Mineral Interests, 51 N.D.L. REv. 369, 370-72 (1974) and
Lacy, Conflicting Surface Interests: Shotgun Diplomacy Revisited, 22 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 731, 748-
68(1976).
19. Not only the federal government, but also the State of North Dakota itself is a large owner of
severed mineral interests. Pursuant to § 38-09-01 of the North Dakota Century Code the state
must reserve 50% of oil, gas, and other minerals in any transfer of state-owned lands. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 38-09-01 (1980). The state reservation was originally 5%, but was increased to 50% in 1941.
See 1939 N.D. SEss. LAws 231; 1941 N.D. SEss. LAWs 238. SinceJune 28, 1960, in any of the state-
owned "school lands," lands originally granted to the state by the United States under the enabling
legislation creating the state in 1889, all oil and gas and other minerals must be reserved to the state.
N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 5. This constitutional requirement for school lands takes precedence over the
statutory reservation in § 38-09-01 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-
09-01 (1980). Haag v. State, 219 N.W.2d 121, 131 (N.D. 1974). The power of the State to grant oil
and gas leases on its original grant lands was challenged early in the history of oil and gas
development in North Dakota, but was definitively established in State v. Amerada Petroleum
Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 262, 49 N.W.2d 14, 23 (1951). The State's power to grant oil and gas leases of
its reserved mineral interests and the procedural requirements for leasing are set out in sections 38-
09-14 through 38-09-20 of the North Dakota Century Code. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-09-14 to -20
(1980). No mineral reservation is required in conveyances by the state to the federal government. Id.
§ 38-09-0 1.1.
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rests, as noted above, upon an analysis of the legally recognized
and protected rights of each and the corresponding duties and
restrictions placed upon each. It is helpful to begin this analysis by
considering the manner in which the North Dakota Supreme Court
has characterized these separate property interests. In Beulah Coal
Mining Co. v. Heihn20 an early decision involving the effect of a
conveyance of land with a reservation of minerals by the grantor,
the court made it clear that the mineral interest is a separate
interest in real property, which may validly be severed from the
ownership of the surface. A reservation of minerals in a deed of real
property is conceptually a conveyance of the reserved minerals back
to the grantor by the grantor himself. 2t A mineral interest may be
conveyed separately from the surface by mineral deed, just as any
other interest in real property may be transferred, and the result is
the same as if the mineral interest were the result of a reservation or
exception.
22
Once the severance of the mineral interest has occurred, by
whichever method, two separate estates in land have been created,
Considerable litigation was required before the exact nature and extent of the State's statutory
mineral reservation was defined. See Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844, 856 (N.D. 1972) (coal
included); Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502, 504 (N.D. 1959) (gravel not included); State v.
Amerada Petroleum Corp., 71 N.W.2d 675, 684 (N.D. 1955) (construing § 15-07-15 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which eliminates the reservation upon resale by the State to a former
private owner, spouse, or lineal descendant in the first degree). The State may reserve no other
substances, nor a larger share, than the statute (or constitution) provides. Convis v. State, 104
N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (N.D. 1960). Local governmental entities may also own mineral interests: 38-
09-02 of the North Dakota Century Code grants townships, cities, school districts, and park districts
the power to grant oil and gas leases on their lands. N.D. CENT. COnE § 38-09-02 (1980). In theory, a
county might also own mineral interests, but most county-owned land has been acquired by
delinquent tax proceedings and a county is not empowered to reserve minerals in any conveyance of
land so acquired. Kershaw v. Burleigh County, 77 N.D. 932, 940, 47 N.W.2d 132, 136 (1951);
Adams County v. Smith, 74 N.D. 621, 630, 23 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1946). In 1951 the statute
providing for mineral reservations in conveyances by a county was repealed. 1951 N.D. SEss. LAWS
172.
20. 46 N.D. 646, 180 N.W. 787 (1920).
Minerals in place are land, and may be conveyed as other lands are conveyed....
Contracts excepting ores and minerals from grants of land, with a reservation of the
right to enter upon the portion thereof granted, are in accordance with long-
established usage, and have been invariably held by the courts to be valid; and not to
be contrary to, but in harmony with, public policy.
Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 651-52, 180 N.W. 787, 789 (1920).
21. See Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, 508 (N. D. 1955). In Reiss v.
Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40, 47 (N.D. 1975), the court refers to this "grant back" theory as
"employing hypertechnical legal reasoning, if not legal fiction." The grantor's retention of a
mineral interest may also be regarded as an "exception" to the quantum of real property conveyed
to the grantee, who receives the grantor's interest except for the retained mineral interest. In North
Dakota there is no difference in legal significance between a "reservation" of minerals and an
"exception" of minerals in a grant. See Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 552 (N.D. 1973).
In some states, however, different consequences may attach to the use of one word or the other in
certain situations. See, e.g., Coyne v. Butler, 396 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
22. See Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 180 N.W. 787 (1920). There are many
subtleties in the conveying of mineral interests that do not arise in transfers of surface interests. For a
recent discussion, see Bledsoe, Conveyancing ofOil and Gas Interests, 32 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N
83(1981).
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which are "as distinct as if they contained two parcels of land." ' 23
The grantee in the mineral deed or the grantor of the surface estate
who has reserved or excepted the minerals holds a separate fee
simple estate in the minerals in place, with all of the legally
protected rights that such an estate entails. 24 Thus, the severed
mineral estate is subject to and enjoys the benefits of all the legal
doctrines applicable to real property. For example, the mineral
owner enjoys the benefits of recording statutes and bonafide
purchaser doctrines, 25 a mineral estate may be acquired by adverse
possession,2 6 title to the minerals may be confirmed by a quiet title
action, 27  an after-acquired interest in the mineral estate passes
23. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956). In North Dakota attempts have been made
to modify this doctrine legislatively by giving the surface owner, in effect, a portion of the mineral
estate by statute. House Bill No. 1626, introduced in the 1981 Legislative Assembly, would have
allowed the surface owner who owned less than 12!/ % of the mineral estate to be entitled to no less
than a 1% royalty interest in the production of the minerals subject to lease. N.D.H.B. 1626, 47th
Leg., § 1 (1981). It further provided that any transfer of the surface estate by a person also owning an
underlying mineral interest must include a transfer to the grantee of enough of the mineral estate so
that the surface owner would own no less than a 12 % mineral interest. Id. Finally, House Bill 1626
provided that a grantor owning both the surface and mineral estates must retain at least 12 Y % of
the mineral estate, or his entire mineral estate if it was greater than that, in any conveyance. Id. After
being rewritten in the house to provide simply that all oil and gas leases must contain a provision
giving the surface owner not less than 1% of the value of the oil and gas produced, the bill passed but
was later defeated in the senate. N.D.H.J. 1187 & N D.S.J. 1557-58, 47TH. LEG. (1981).
House Bill 1335 would have required any person holding title to the surface and a portion of
the mineral estate to have also conveyed the mineral interest in any conveyance of the surface.
N.D.H.B. 1335. 47th Leg., § 1 (1981). A 25% limitation, the significance of which was not clear,
also appeared in the bill, which was defeated in the house. N.D.H.J. 1137-38, 47th Leg. (1981).
24. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, 505 (N.D. 1955). Under the
typical language used in the granting instrument, this right will be a "fee simple estate in the
minerals 'in or under' the land in question." Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D.
1973). The purpose of this Article is to consider to what extent these rights will be protected against
the claims of the surface owner. Seesupra, notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
The question of what kinds of minerals the grantee acquires is a complex one, depending upon
the language used in the conveying instrument and the intent of the parties, as well as the date of the
conveyance, and is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions, see Beck. "And Other Alinerals"
as Interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 52 N.D.L. Rrv. 633 (1976), and Reeves, The Meaning of
the Word "'Minerals, " 54 N.D.L. REv. 419 (1978). The mutual intent of the parties regarding the
instrument is the primary controlling factor, in the absence of specific statutory provisions. See, e.g.,
Perschke v. Burlington N., Inc., 311 N.W.2d 564, 567 (N.D. 1981).
25. See Nodiand v. Plainsmen Petroleum, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 252, 255 (N.D. 1978);
Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 N.W.2d 497, 506 (N.D. 1955). In a series of decisions
early in the history ofoil and gas production in North Dakota the supreme court made it very clear
that bona fide purchasers of mineral interests were entitled to full legal protection of their interests.
Dockter v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 691, 695 (N.D. 1954); Hoffer v. Crawford, 65 N.W.2d 625, 633
(N.D. 1954); Dixon v. Kaufman, 79 N.D. 633, 644, 58 N.W.2d 797, 803 (1953).
26. The applicability of the doctrine of adverse possession usually arises in a negative context.
The court frequently has noted that since a severed mineral estate and the surface estate are separate
estates in land, title to a mineral interest cannot be acquired by adverse possession of the surface
only. E.g., Wisness v. Paniman, 120 N.W.2d 594, 595 (N.D. 1963); Yttredahl v. Federal Farm
Mortgage Corp., 104 N.W.2d 705, 708 (N.D. 1960); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Advance Realty Co., 78
N.W.2d 705, 719 (N.D. 1956). Possession of the surface is entirely consistent with separate
ownership of a severed mineral interest, so that surface occupancy does not provide constructive
notice of any possessory claim to mineral rights. Dixon v. Kaufman, 79 N.D. 633, 644, 58 N.W.2d
797, 803 (1953). It follows, therefore, that adverse possession of severed mineral rights, adverse to
the surface owner or adverse to another claimant to the mineral interest, can occur only by engaging
in producing them by drilling or mining. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956). If there
has been no severance, adverse possession of the surface under the usual conditions gives title to the
surface and the mineral estate. Payne v. A. M. Fruh Co., 98 N.W.2d 27, 32 (N.D. 1959).
27. See, e.g., Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40,41 (N.D. 1975); Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d
363, 364 (N.D. 1975); Corbett v. La Bere, 68 N.W.2d 211, 212 (N.D. 1955).
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under a warranty of title provision, 28 a mineral interest that is not
severed from the surface is subject to a mortgage granted in the
land, 29 the usual rules applicable to cotenancy in land govern the
interrelations between mineral owners holding interests as tenants
in common, 30 and statutory restraints limiting suspension of the
power of alienation are applicable.
3'
As an interest in real property, a severed mineral interest is,
theoretically, subject to separate assessment for real property
taxes.3 2 If the mineral interest or interests in particular minerals
have not been severed from the surface, their value should be
included in the general tax assessment of the property. 33 As a
practical matter, however, severed minerals have never successfully
been assessed separately for taxation purposes in North Dakota,
due in part to the difficulty of fixing a proper valuation for the
mineral interest.3 4 The theoretical basis for property taxes is that
they compensate for the protection afforded to property rights by
the legal might of the state. It would be thought, therefore, that
surface owners in disputes over surface damages might raise the
point that they pay taxes while the severed mineral owner does not
28. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. A. M. Fruh Co., 137 N.W.2d 664, 666 (N.D. 1965); Aure v.
Mackoff, 93 N.W.2d 807, 811 (N.D. 1958).
29. Skelly Oil Co. v. A. M. Fruh Co., 137 N.W.2d 664, 666 (N.D. 1965). Holders of severed
mineral interests granted subsequent to the mortgage must be given notice and named as parties in a
mortgage foreclosure proceeding in order for their rights to be affected by the foreclosure. Yttredahl
v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 104 N.W.2d 705, 709 (N.D. 1960). It follows from the separate
nature of the surface estate and a severed mineral estate that a mortgage given by the surface owner
after severance is a lien against the surface only and not against the mineral estate. Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 715 (N.D. 1956).
30. See, e.g., Schank v. North Am. Royalties, Inc., 201 N.W.2d 419, 429-30 (N.D. 1972); Smith
v. Nyreen, 81 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (N.D. 1957).
31. Carlson v. Tioga Holding Co., 72 N.W.2d 236, 239 (N.D. 1955). Statutes such as § 47-02-
27 of the North Dakota Century Code are commonly referred to as the "rule against perpetuities,"
although the North Dakota Supreme Court has noted that the common law rule against perpetuities
is not in force in this state. Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799, 807 (N.D. 1955); see N.D. CENT.
ConE § 47-02-27 (1980).
32. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Oliver County, 38 N.D. 57, 64, 164 N.W. 315, 318
(1917).
33. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 718 (N.D. 1956). If the land is
forfeited to the county for delinquent taxes assessed against the surface owner after severance of the
mineral estate the county acquires only the surface. Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 887 (N.D. 1956).
Conversely, if the county tax lien attaches before severance, the county acquires the mineral interest
along with the surface. Payne v. A. M. Fruh Co., 98 N.W.2d 27, 32 (N.D. 1959).
34. On two occasions the court has held legislative attempts to place a tax on severed mineral
interests to be unconstitutional. In Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 57 N.D. 1, 10-11, 220
N.W. 436, 439-40 (1928), a flat 3% tax on severed minerals was held to be an arbitrary and
unreasonable classification of property, by form of ownership rather than by type of property, and
was also held to violate § 179 of the State Constitution (currently N.D. CoNsT. art. X, S 4)
requiring local assessment where the property is situated. In Northwestern Improvement Co. v.
Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 42, 47 N.W.2d 543, 550-51 (1951), a three cent per acre privilege tax
on minerals severed by reservation in deeds, when no development of the minerals had occurred, was
held invalid as an arbitrary classification because the manner of severance could not constitutionally
be made the basis of classification for taxation. This taxation question has continued to surface
regularly in the legislative sessions in this state. During the 198-1- session of the North Dakota
Legislative Assembly, for example, two bills dealing with taxation of severed mineral interests,
Senate Bills 2421 and 2439, were introduced in the senate and defeated without crossing to the house
side. N.D.S.J. 847 & 1496, 47th Leg. (1981).
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and, thus, they should be entitled to greater protection of the law.
This does not seem to be an argument that is normally made,
however.
The severed mineral estate may take several different forms,
all of which are interests in real property. It may, depending on the
form of the instrument creating it, be what is commonly called a
"mineral interest" in the technical sense. The holder of such a
mineral interest is regarded as the "absolute" owner of the severed
minerals in place with the right to produce them or to dispose of
them as he chooses.3 5 It is in pursuing that right, generally through
a lessee, that conflicts with surface owners arise. If the interest is
simply a "royalty interest," however, the holder has a right to
some specified fraction of the minerals, or to the proceeds thereof,
upon production, but no right to produce the minerals himself.36 A
royalty owner, therefore, does not normally become involved in
surface damage issues. Like the mineral interest, the royalty
interest is an interest in real property with all the resulting
attributes of such interests. 7
A third category of mineral estate, the one of most concern in
this Article, is the interest acquired by the lessee under a mineral
lease, specifically an oil and gas lease. A thorough discussion of all
of the ramifications of a typical oil and gas lease is beyond the scope
of this Article and is not necessary for discussion of the surface
damage issue. What is important is to recognize that an oil and gas
lease is in many ways quite different from an ordinary lease of real
35. See Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W.2d 543 (1951).
The distinctive features of a "mineral interest" were summarized by the court in Texaro Oil Co. v.
Mosser: "A 'mineral interest' is a real property interest created in oil and gas in place.... The prime
characteristic of a mineral interest is the right to enter the land to explore, drill, produce and
otherwise carry on mining activities." 299 N.V.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1980) (citation omitted).
36. Id. "It is this attribute of operating rights that distinguishes a mineral interest from a royalty
interest." Id.
37. Payne s. A. M, Fruh Co., 98 N.W. 2d 27, 30 (N.D. 1959); Van Sickle v. Olsen, 92 N.W.
2d 777. 782 (N.D. 1958). An assignment of a royalty interest is, therefore, a grant of real property.
Knox v. Krueger, 145 N.W. 2d 904, 909 (N.D. 1966). Once minerals have been produced and
separated from the ground they lose their real property character and become personal property, as
do any interests in the produced minerals. Thus, in Corbett v. La Bere. 68 N.W. 2d 211, 214 (N.D.
1955), the court noted that "unaccrued royalty . . . is an interest in real estate entitling the royalty
owner to share in the production of the minerals." In Federal Land Bank v. State, 274 N. W.2d 580,
583 (N.D. 1979), the court held that " 'produced' or 'severed' minerals are personal property, not
real" property. The term "severed," as used in Federal Land Bank, refers to separation from the
ground, not "severance' of the mineral estate from the surface estate as that term is used herein.
The supreme court may have created some unfortunate confusion in its recent decision of
Texaro Oil Co. v. Mosser, 299 N.W.2d 191, 194 (N.D. 1980), when it stated that a royalty interest
is personal property. A close reading of the decision, however, reveals that what the court must have
been referring to was the royalty owner's interest in produced or severed minerals. After referring to
royalty as the landowner's share of production "at severance." the court stated: "A royalty interest
is personal property and refers to the owner's right to receive a certain part of the proceeds from oil
and gas, leases if and when there is production. " Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). When one
reads this to mean the royalty interest in produced minerals, then the statement is consistent with the
well-established rule set out in Payne and Corbett, supra note 37. that royalty interests are real
property. For another view of this issue see Maxwell, Some Comments on North Dakota Oil and Gas Law
- Three Cases from the Eighties, 58 N.D.L. RE\'. 431 (1982).
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property. Like any lease of land it does constitute an estate or
interest in real property, 38 but it conveys much more than simply
the right to undisturbed possession for some defined period of time.
An oil and gas lease bears more resemblance to the common
law concept of a profit a prendre, a right to extract something from
land, than it does to a typical real property lease. 39 This was the
characterization noted by the North Dakota Supreme Court for
describing oil and gas leases in Corbett v. La Bere4 ° and Alfson v.
Anderson, 4 1 and it suggests quite aptly the nature of the interest
conveyed by such a lease. One significant distinction is that a
common law profit a prendre was not necessarily an exclusive right,
as the landowner did not relinquish his right to extract the
substances from the land, 42 whereas the oil and gas lessee normally
acquires an exclusive right from the mineral owner to drill for and
produce oil and gas.
43
38. Ulrich v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 66 N.W.2d 397, 402 (N.D. 1954). This is true ofany
mineral lease, as first stated by the North Dakota court in Petroleum Exchange, Inc. v. Poynter, 64
N.W.2d 718, 726 (N.D. 1954). It follows that an assignment of such a lease, a very common practice
in the industry, is also a conveyance of real property. Mar Win Dev. Co. v. Wilson, 104 N.W.2d
369, 373 (N.D. 1960).
39. A concise definition of a profit a prendre, or simply a "profit," was stated in A HISTORY OF
ANGLO AMERICAN LAW: "A profit is an incorporeal right to enter upon the land of another and to
take and carry away a product or profit of the land, such as grass, fruit, timber or firewood, coal, iron
or other mineral, fish or game." W. WALSH, A HISTORY Or ANGLo AMERICAN LAW 262-63 (2d ed.
1932). The right to dig for coal and other minerals was one of the earliest forms of profits and derives
from the rights in the common land, which early villagers enjoyed before it came to be considered as
belonging to their feudal overlords. Id. at 263. Blackstone refers to a profit as a "common, or right of
common." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32.
40. 68 N.W.2d 211, 214 (N.D. 1955) (quoting Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, -, 43
P.2d 788, 792 (1935)).
41. 78 N.W.2d 693, 702 (N.D. 1956) (quoting Gavina v. Smith, 25 Cal. 2d 501, _ 501
P.2d 681, 683 (1944)). A distinction is sometimes made between states such as North Dakota, which
treat the lessee as having acquired rights to oil and gas in place, and those that treat the lessee as
having acquired an incorporeal hereditament. I E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OI AND GAS LEASES S 3.02
(2d ed. 1973). Although a profit a prendre is classified as an incorporeal hereditament, it is also an
interest in real property. In any case, the classification of the lessee's rights as corporeal or
incorporeal does not affect the question of his rights to use the surface. I WIiI TAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 5, § 210.4.
42. W. WALSH, supra note 39, at 263 n.43.
43. An interesting question arises through the analogy to a profit aprendre in connection with the
question of abandonment of the interest. A profit a prendre can be abandoned by a nonuser with intent
to abandon; this doctrine has been used to support abandonment of mineral rights. See Manning,
Mineral Rights Versus Surface Rights, 2 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 329, 344-45 (1969). Some states have
enacted statutes that purport to extinguish mineral rights which have been unused for a specified
period of years in an effort to promote the clearing and simplifying of "dormant" mineral titles, and
presumably to stimulate development of the minerals. Constitutional challenges to such statutes in
Indiana and Michigan were brought before the United States Supreme Court. In Texaco, Inc. v.
Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 794-97 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the Indiana Dormant Mineral
Interests Act did not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
and did not run afoul of the commerce clause. The case dealing with the Michigan statute was
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Larsen v. Van Slooten. 102 S. Ct 1242 (1982).
For a general discussion of the abandonment question, see I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, §
210.1. The general question of undeveloped mineral interests, including statutes on abandoned
minerals, is discussed in Kuntz, Old and New Soltions to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped
Mineral Interest, 22 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 81 (1971). For a discussion of dormant mineral
acts, see Note, Dormant Mineral Statutes and Abandoned Severed Mineral Interests, 58 N.D. L. REV. 611
(1982).
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The "mineral owner" in this context is generally a lessee
under an oil and gas lease, or an assignee of the original lessee,
since the actual owners of the oil and gas normally do not develop
their interests themselves but rather lease them to developers,
retaining a royalty interest for themselves under the lease. 44 In the
common situation in which disputes over surface damages may
arise there will generally be at least three separate sets of interests:
those of the surface fee owner, those of the severed mineral owner
who typically leases his interest to a developer, and those of the
developer-lessee.4 5 The lessor of severed oil and gas interests is
generally a bystander in the disputes over surface damages, as the
question is whether the surface owner must bear the risk of the
particular damages resulting from the lessee's drilling or
exploratory operations, or whether the latter must compensate the
surface owner in some manner for the damages.
46
III. DOMINANCE OF THE MINERAL ESTATE
Before analyzing the North Dakota cases that have dealt with
disputes between the surface owner and the oil and gas operator
over surface damage claims, it will be helpful to review briefly the
general law on the question. Certain general principles have
emerged from the large body of litigation on this subject, though a
number of uncertainties persist so that many issues remain in a
state of constant flux. As one commentator has aptly characterized
the situation:
Despite a long history of experience and a fairly
extensive body of judicial precedent, the questions of
whether, and to what extent, and under what
circumstances the oil and gas lessee may occupy and use
the surface of the leased premises to find, produce, and
44. See generally Corbett v. La Bere, 68 N.W.2d 211, 213-14(N.D. 1955).
45. These individual interests may be split among many different persons. The surface estate,
for example, may be held by a number of persons in cotenancy or there may be a surface tenant
leasing from the surface owner. The mineral ownership may be split between the lessor and owners
of separate royalty interests, and different minerals may be owned by different persons. Finally. the
working interest may be split among a number of lessees and assignees of lessees, and may be
burdened with outstanding overriding royalty interests. Also, any of a number of possible
arrangements that affect the sharing of the working interest, such as farm out agreements, may have
been entered into. It is useful, however, for purposes of discussion to categorize the types of interests
into these three broad groups.
46. This is not to say that the lessor may not be interested in the resolution and outcome of the
dispute, as his interest is in seeing production of the oil and gas proceed smoothly and expeditiously
so that he can reap the reward in the form of his royalty payments. However, the amount of those
royalties will not be directly affected by whether the lessee must pay for surface damages. This




remove the oil and gas therefrom, and dispose of waste
products, now seem to arise more often than before, and
frequently the answers seem more elusive than ever. 47
The analysis generally starts with the proposition that the
mineral estate is the "dominant" estate to which the surface estate
is subservient. 48  Simply characterizing the mineral estate as
"dominant," however, does not provide a solution to the question
of liability for surface damages. 49  The consequence of this
dominant status is usually stated to be that the mineral owner or
lessee has the legally protected right to use as much of the surface
overlying the minerals, and to use it in such manner, as is
reasonably necessary for his exploration, development, and
production of his mineral interest. 50 This right exists by implication
under the grant of mineral rights, whether by lease or otherwise,
since if it did not the minerals might be inaccessible and the
mineral estate would be worthless. 51 It is possible for the lessee's
rights of surface user to be expressly set out in the lease, which may
be construed to negate any further or additional rights by
implication.52 Modern leases, however, expressly grant quite broad
rights of surface user to the lessee so that it is unlikely that the lease
47. Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights qf Lessees Under Oil and Gas Leases to Use and Occupy the
Surface, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 227, 227 (1975).
48. E.g., Ferguson, Severed Surface and Mineral Estates - Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to
Recover Minerals, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411, 414-18 (1974); Sellers, How Dominant is the
Dominant Estate? or, Surface Damages Revisited, 13 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 377, 378 (1962);
Comment, Land Uses Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 TEX. L. REV. 889, 890 (1959).
49. See Manning, Mineral Rights versus Surface Rights, 2 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 329, 330 (1969).
The author noted that "lain overly simplified solution to the problem of conflicting surface uses
which has been suggested too frequently by the courts has been to describe the mineral estate as the
dominant estate." Id.
50. E.g., 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218, at 186.32; Jones, The Oil Operator and Surface
Damages, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 339, 341 (1971). For a discussion of what constitutes reasonably
necessary use, see Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 16 (1973).
51. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218, at 186.32. As one commentator observes:
It has been stated time after time, in law review articles, legal briefs, and court
decisions, that an ordinary or conventional oil and gas lease carries with it the implied
right to possess and use so much of the surface in such manner as is reasonably
necessary to enable the lessee to perform all legitimate obligations imposed upon him
by the lease, and to effectuate the purposes of the lease.
Browder, Accommodation of the Conflicting Interests of the Mineral Owner and the Surface Owner, 25 INST. ON
OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 85, 92 (1974). The dominance of the mineral estate may be said to flow from
the necessity of implying rights of reasonable surface user so that the holder of mineral rights, the oil
and gas lessee in the context of this discussion, will be able to enjoy the estate he has acquired.
Manning, supra note 49, at 332. "This is based upon the principle that when a thing is granted all the
means to obtain it and all the fruits and effects of it are also granted." Healy, Rights of Mineral Owners
in Surface, I ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 85, 89 (1955). The oil and gas lessee's implied right to
reasonably necessary use of the surface necessarily includes the right of ingress and egress from the
drillsite. Id. at 91; Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 995, 1003 (1980).
52. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218.1; Cage, The Modern Oil and Gas Lease -A Facelift
forOld88, 31 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 177, 194(1980).
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terms themselves will prove unduly restrictive. 53
To characterize the mineral estate as dominant is not to vest it
with an absolute supremacy. If dominance meant that the mineral
owner always prevailed, then the question of liability for surface
damages would disappear, as the surface owner would always be on
the losing side.5 4 The doctrine is limited by the rule that the lessee's
use of the surface must be reasonably necessary; if this restriction
does not answer the question it does, at least, provide a framework
for analysis that is often used by the courts. 55 As one commentator
points out in discussing the broad language of the typical form
lease:
Nevertheless, such language is not intended to convey to
the lessee the use of the entire surface without restraint;
his use is limited. He is entitled to enter upon and use
only so much of the leased premises, and only in such
fashion, as may reasonably be necessary to carry out the
terms of the lease and to effectuate its purposes. This rule
seems logical and equitable; its practical application rests
with the courts, and often the juries.
56
The dominance of the mineral estate, therefore, does not give
the oil and gas lessee the right to totally destroy the surface. He is
entitled only to such use as is reasonably necessary, and he may not
make unreasonable use of the surface. Total destruction of the
surface by an oil and gas lessee during exploration, drilling, or
production operations would normally be regarded as
"unreasonable. 1 51 It is fair to say that such a right would not be
53. See Moses, Peaceful Coexistence Between Lessor and Lessee Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 38 Tot . ..
REV. 341, 342 (1964). For example, the lease form currently in use for oil and gas leases by the State
of North Dakota provides that the lessor does as follows:
[Llease exclusively to lessee the property described below, for the purpose of exploring
- for, by geological, geophysical and other methods, and drilling for, and producing oil
and/or gas from the leased premises . . . and with the right of ingress and egress and
the right to use as much of the leased premises as shall be reasonably necessary to the
purpose of this lease including but not limited to the right to build roads, lay and
maintain gathering and transmission lines, and erect and maintain communication
lines, buildings, tanks, power stations, and other structures, appliances, and
equipment.
See generally 2 E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 18.02 (1973); Anderson, David v.
Goliath: Negotiating the "Lessor's 88" and Representing Lessors and Surface Owners in Oil and Gas Lease Plays,
27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1029 (1982).
54. Browder, supra note 51, at 89; Ferguson, supra note 48, at 414-15.
55. See Browder, supra note 51, at 89-92.
56. See Moses, supra note 53, at 354.
57. See Patton, Recent Changes in the Correlative R'hts of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 19, 41-42 (1973). A dilemma is presented by the case of a mineral that is recoverable
only by a technique which necessarily destroys the surface, such as the strip mining of lignite coal in
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implied and that most courts would require a fairly clear express
grant of the right to destroy the surface.58
The limitation of reasonable necessity placed on the rights of a
lessee or other owner of the dominant mineral estate regarding his
use of the surface is often characterized as requiring the lessee to act
with "due regard" for the rights of the surface owner. 59 This has
led to the theory that there should be an "accommodation"
between the interrelated rights of the mineral owner and the surface
owner, still recognizing, however, the traditional dominance
accorded to the mineral estate. 60 The notion that due regard for the
interests of the surface owner requires an accommodation between
his rights and those of the mineral developer first achieved
widespread currency in the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in
North Dakota. In this case there is no reasonable alternative. The surface mining reclamation
statutes have sought to find a solution by requiring restoration of the surface after mining, that is by
undoing the destruction of the surface. See supra note 2. Consent of the surface owner is required by
statute before coal may be strip mined on his land, or if consent cannot be obtained, an action in the
district court may be brought and damages awarded to the surface owner to compensate him for lost
agricultural production, lost land value, and loss of the value of improvements on the land. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 38-18-06 (Supp. 1981). For a discussion of this problem, including legislative attempts
at a solution and a proposed model act, see Dycus, Legislative Clarification qf the Correlative Rights of
Surface and Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1980).
This problem of surface destruction from strip mining of coal and other minerals near the
surface has led to litigation over, and statutory provisions governing, the question of what
"minerals" are included in a grant, reservation, or lease of minerals. Lopez, supra note 51, at 1002-
03: Patton, supra, at 19-30. In Hovden v. Lind, 301 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 1981), the North Dakota
Supreme Court expressed concern about surface destruction when construing the phrase "all other
minerals," reserved in a land sale contract, to exclude clay and scoria:
A reasonable construction of the word "minerals" as used in a land sale contract
excludes clay and scoria, as well as gravel. The rationale for similar holdings in other
cases is that these substances, if they are not literally part of the surface itself, cannot
be removed without damaging the surface.
Id. at 378. The court also noted that the buyers had objected to any reservation of coal because strip
mining could destroy their interest in the surface. Id. at 376. In Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363,
367 (N.D. 1975), the court noted that if it could be shown that strip mining constitutes destruction or
permanent damage to the surface, as opposed simply to "use" of the surface, then the doctrine that
gives the mineral owner the implied right to reasonably necessary use of the surface might have to be
reexamined. For a discussion of the North Dakota law on the question of what is meant by
"minerals," see Beck, "And Other Minerals" as Interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, 52 N.D. L.
REV. 633 (1976).
58. Lopez, supra note 51, at 1004. A frequently cited decision of the Texas Supreme Court states
the principle concisely: "Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed . . .a
grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should not be construed to include a substance
that must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate." Acker
v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). The requirement to provide subjacent support to the
surface would also apply to limit recovery of minerals by methods that destroy the surface. Twitty,
Law afSubjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface in Mining Operations, 6 ROCKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 497, 498 (1961).
59. E.g., Jones, supra note 50, at 341-42; Lambert, Surface Rights of the Oil and Gas Lessee, 11 OKLA
L. REV. 373, 374 (1958); Manning, supra note 49, at 331-32. It has been noted that courts have
tended to give more weight to the dominance of the mineral estate than to the concern for due regard
for the surface owner. Comment, supra note 48, at 890. Under the "accommodation doctrine,"
however, the due regard owed to the surface estate is fully honored. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
60. Browder, supra note 51. The North Dakota Supreme Court embraced this concept in Hunt
Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979). See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying
text.
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Gety Oil Co. v. Jones.6 ' The lessee in that case was using pumping
units that extended to heights above the surface which prevented
the surface owner from using, in the vicinity of the pumping units,
the self-propelled sprinkler units required by his irrigation system.
The Texas court upheld an appellate court decision reversing the
trial court's decision, which had recognized the mineral lessee's
dominant rights to use the pumping units. Witnesses testified that
adjoining lessees had been able to use other types of pumping units
which were below the height that would interfere with the irrigation
system, and that the cost of such equipment was not excessive.
Thus, an accommodation could be reached between the conflicting
interests by giving due regard to the surface owner's interests
through a finding that reasonable alternative means existed by
which the oil and gas lessee could realize the value of his interests.
62
The accommodation doctrine set out in Getty stirred up
considerable controversy and provoked dire predictions that the
traditional rights of the mineral owner had been abrogated. 63 It is
important, however, to maintain a proper perspective by keeping
in mind what Gety did not hold. A review of the language of the
decision reveals that it did not constitute a radical departure from
traditional law, but in fact fit solidly into the mold of previously
established principles. The Gety accommodation doctrine focuses
on the relative rights of the mineral owner and the surface owner in
a particular factual context, instead of upsetting the traditional
dominance of the mineral estate. As the court itself pointed out, it
was simply applying the usual "reasonable necessity" test to the
facts in the case. 64 A number of criteria must be met before a given
61. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
62. Getty Oil Co. v..Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 619-23 (Tex. 1971). This doctrine of "alternative
means" has been hailed as a useful method for handling surface damage controversies:
The doctrine ofaiternative means, as expounded by the supreme court in Getty, can be
summarized in the following manner: when a conflict occurs between the surface
estate and the mineral estate, and the surface owner has no other choice in how he
develops the surface while the dominant estate has at least one alternative which will
not interfere with the surface development, the dominant estate must follow that
alternative. A more expansive use of this doctrine could provide a means of handling
disputes over correlative surface rights on a case by case basis.
Note, The Surface Mineral Producer v. the Oil and Gas Producer- A Needfor Peaceful Coexistence, 29 BAYLOR L.
REV. 907, 923 (1977).
63..Jones, supra note 50, at 351. Writing after the decision of the appellate court and before the
Texas Supreme Court had affirmed it, the author stated categorically: "Furthermore, it is submitted
that in the event this holding is affirmed by the Supreme Court, the concept of the mineral lessee as
the holder of the dominant surface estate will be virtually overturned." Id. Another commentator
observed that the protection afforded to the surface owner by the accommodation or due regard
doctrine enunciated in Getty "suggests that the traditional dominance of the mineral estate may be
waning." Lopez, supra note 51, at 1007.
64. Getty Oil Co. v.Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621-22 (Tex. 1971). In Getty Oil, the court stated:
ITIhe rights implied in favor of the mineral estate are to be exercised with due regard
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surface use by the lessee will be found to be unreasonable so as to
require yielding to a conflicting claim of right to use by the surface
owner. At the outset the surface owner has the burden of
establishing that the lessee's surface use is unreasonable. The
reasonableness of the lessee's surface use is to be tested by the
"usual, customary and reasonable practices in the industry under
like circumstances of time, place and servient estate uses. "65 A
crucial principle is that if the lessee's use is "the only reasonable,
usual and customary method that is available for developing and
producing the minerals on this particular land," then the surface
owner must yield to the use by the lessee. 66 If the surface owner has
a reasonable alternative method for accomplishing his purposes,
other than by the method in question, then his use of that method
must yield to the lessee's method of surface use. 67 Even if this is not
the case, the surface owner must nevertheless show that the lessee's
method of surface use is unreasonable because there are alternative
methods available in customary use in the industry that could be
employed by the lessee on the type of property in question. 68 It is
evident that the surface owner bears a substantial burden if he is to
prevail against the mineral owner under the due regard or
accommodation theory. The surface owner may not prevail merely
upon a showing that the lessee's use of the surface causes him
inconvenience. 69 The net result would appear to be that while the
doctrine may have caused the courts to take a closer look at the
surface owner's claim, the lessee should prevail if he can show that
his use meets the usual test of being reasonably necessary. The due
regard concept is essentially a part of that test. 70
It is fair to say, therefore, despite some indications of a
broadened concern for the rights of the surface owner,7 that the
mineral estate retains the important attributes of its dominant
for the rights of the owner of the servient estate. .... The due regard concept defines
more fully what is to be considered in the determination of whether a surface use by
the lessee is reasonably necessary.
Id.
65. Id. at 627.
66. Id. at 628.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 623; Browder, supra note 51, at 99; Lopez, supra note 51, at 1007 n.46.
70. Browder, supra note 51, at 100. Browder analyzed the Getty decision and noted that "with
proper definition of 'reasonableness' and 'unreasonableness' of the lessee's surface use, the law has
probably not been changed to such extent as viewed with loud acclaim by some of the surface owners
and with cries of anguish by some of the oil company operators." Id. This observation is consistent
with the rationale of the decision of the North Dakota court based on the approach set out in Getty in
Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979), discussed infra, notes 126-43 and
accompanying text.
71. See Bennett, Damages to the Landowner Following the Oil and Gas Lease, 13 S. D. L. REv. 29, 46
(1968): Manning, supra note 49, at 337-41.
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status. Perhaps the most important of these, and one that is
sometimes overlooked when the surface owner confronts the lessee
with a surface damage claim, is that there is no right to
compensation for damage caused by the lessee's operations if they
are reasonably necessary in fact. The fact that the lessee has a
legally protected right to such surface use means that his acts will
not expose him to liability for damages. He has a "right of'
ownership" in the sense alluded to by Justice Holmes and,
therefore, is "accountable to no one. 7v2 In effect, the surface owner
may suffer a loss, but he is not "damaged" in the legal sense of
being able to look to the lessee to be made whole.7 3 Reasonably
necessary uses by the lessee cannot serve as the basis for a valid
compensable damage claim.14 Since it is well known that some
surface damage inevitably results from reasonable oil and gas
operations, the parties to the instrument severing the minerals,
whether a lease or a mineral deed, must be deemed to have had this
in mind when striking their bargain. 
7 5
It has been properly pointed out that it is undesirable for the
lessee simply to settle all surface damage claims as though he were
necessarily liable for all damages of any kind.7 6 This is not to say
72. See supra note 12.
73. Lambert, supra note 59, at 381. The author states:
Thus, in the absence of lease provisions to the contrary, even though the lessee does
damage to the soil, trees, or crops, if his operations are reasonable and incidental to his
development of the leased premises, such damage is damnum absque in'uria and no
recovery can be had therefor against the lessee....
Id. This question is analyzed within the context of North Dakota law infra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.
74. Keeton &.Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 TEx. L. REV. 1, 3 (1956). This
result of the dominance of the mineral estate may be rationalized on the theory that the oil and gas
lessor has impliedly authorized such reasonably necessary use by the lessee, thereby assuming the
risk of any resulting damage to the surface from operations which are customary in the industry- Id.
at 3, 10, 12. Of course this is of no consolation to the surface owner who does not own aiy part of the
minerai interest.
75. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218.12, at 245-46. If asked later, of course, the
surface owner might be surprised to learn that he had in mind the particular damage which tlid
occur. It has been suggested that the lessor should not be regarded as having contemplated or
impliedly authorized operations that cause more surface damage than any royalties he might receive
from mineral production. See, supra note 74, at 13. The surface owner acquired his rights sub ject to
whatever implied rights of surface use passed by mineral conveyances, or were retained by mineral
reservations, earlier in his chain of title.
76. Jones, supra note 50, at 357-58. The commentator stated:
Unfortunately, the practice has grown up in the oil industry over the years to
settle many damage claims with little investigation as to whether or not grounds for
liability exist. This is the case in some instances even where the demand is patently
unwarranted .... This practice has given rise to some undesirable side effects in that it
has invited damage claims that lack substance.
Id. See Manning, supra note 49, at 337-38. If the lessee or other mineral owner were to be held strictly
liable for all surface damages the public policy basis underlying the dominance of the mineral estate
might be thwarted or at least discouraged. Referring to the "public policy which encourages the
exploration, development and production of energy-producing natural resources which are vital to
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that there are not situations in which the lessee may be liable to the
surface owner for damages. Liability does not arise automatically
out of the relationship between lessee and surface owner, however,
or out of the fact that some kind of surface damage has been caused.
If liability does exist it must be premised on tort or contract, or in
some cases theories of negligence per se or strict liability based on
breach of a statute or administrative rule. Putting aside for the
moment the questions of negligence per se and strict liability, the
lessee may be held liable for breach of the lease terms on a contract
basis, or for negligent or excessive use of the surface or for private
nuisance on the basis of traditional tort law.77 Other related
theories of tort liability, such as nuisance, trespass, and the duty
not to cause damage intentionally or wantonly, may also provide a
basis for recovery of surface damages. There is some blending and
overlapping among these theories of tort liability because excessive
use of the surface may constitute trespass or nuisance and because
negligence is not always separable from trespass and excessive
use.78 At any rate, it is clear that there must be some recognizable
contract or tort basis before surface damage liability can be
imposed upon the lessee:
[I]f the lessor' cannot prove negligence, he must show
unreasonable user or some other ground of tort liability,
absent a contractual provision to pay damages. This is to
say that the lessee may damage land, crops and
improvements without paying damages if no tort or
contractual liability can be shown. 7 9
Liability based upon breach of the lease will be of little use to
the surface owner when his interest has been severed from the oil
and gas interests so that he is not a party to the lease, unless the
lease provisions can be construed to have the character of third
the health, safety and defense of our country," one commentator observes that "[miost of us will
agree that the public policy interest is more than sufficient justification for the dominance accorded
the mineral estate." Id. at 333.
77. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218.10; Davis, Selected Problems Regarding Lessee's Rights
and Obligations to the Surface Owner, 8 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 315, 319-20 (1963). The mineral
owner has always been liable for damages to the surface caused by such tortious acts. Lopez, supra
note 51, at 1007.
78. Scott, Oil and Gas Lease Clauses Relating to Surface Damage and Use of the Surface, 13 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 317, 319-22 (1967). For example, the author poses the case in which the lessee clears a
site but does not drill. It could be claimed that he is guilty of excessive use because he has used more
of the land than was reasonably necessary, which is essentially a trespass. It could also be said that he
has failed to use reasonable care in not having foreseen that a well should not or could not have been
drilled. Id. at 321. Use of more of the surface than reasonably necessary may also be regarded as-
creating a private nuisance. Lopez, supra note 51, at 1011.
79. Scott, supra note 78, at 322.
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party beneficiary contracts. When liability is based on contract, the
liability may be a result of a breach of the lease with the resulting
obligation to pay damages, or it may be a result of damages payable
under an express lease provision for some specified surface
consequence resulting from acts of the lessee. 80
A common lease provision of the latter type found in most
modern leases is a clause providing that the lessee shall pay for
damages to growing crops on the land caused by its operation. This
language will clearly create liability for any damage actually done
to the crops, however reasonable the lessee's mode of operation
may have been, since the express clause negates the right of
reasonably necessary use to the extent it results in damage to
growing crops. 81 It has been observed that this crop damage
provision may be more for the benefit of the lessee than the surface
owner, since it may operate as a limitation, impliedly excluding
liability for other forms of surface damage. 82 This exclusion would
not apply to claims for other forms of damages based on tort
theories since the express lease clause deals with only the
contractual promise to pay damages, not with liability imposed by
law. 83 If the lease does not contain a clause providing for payment
for damage to growing crops, then there is no obligation to pay any
such damages that result from reasonably prudent operations on
the part of the lessee, assuming he has caused no intentional
unnecessary harm or has used no more of the surface than
reasonably necessary. 84
The usual basis for surface damage claims premised on tort is
negligence. Although nuisance is a possible theory, it is more often
subsumed under the notion of excessive use of the surface or one of
the other theories justifying recovery. 85 Trespass is another possible
80. See id. at 323-25.
81. Davis, supra note 77, at 340-41. There may be disputes about what is encompassed within
the term "growing crops," for example, whether native grasses used for pasture or stubble are
included. Id. at 341-42; Moses, supra note 53, at 346-49. As usual in tort actions, the plaintiff must
prove that the crop damage was actually caused by the lessee's operations. The surface damage
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating causation. Scott, supra note 78, at 324.
82. See Cage, supra note 52, at 195. The writer refers to the crop damage clause as a "mirage"
provision: "The obligations to pay for damages caused to growing crops is a real mirage. It means
that lessee has not expressly or by implication agreed to pay for any other kind of surface damage."
Id.
83. See Scott, supra note 78, at 328-29; Cage, supra note 52, at 195. In some leases the phrase
"growing crops" has been crossed out of the damage clause. This indicates that a knowledgeable
lessor has bargained for a broader clause, which provides that lessee agrees to pay for damages
caused by its operations, implying by failing to specify the kinds of damages that all kinds are
covered. One cannot argue with the observation that striking the phrase "growing crops" is
advisable from the landowner's point of view. See Bennett, supra note 71, at 36.
84. Moses, supra note 53, at 347.
85. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218.10, at 229. This notion is stated as follows:
Occasionally a surface owner or a claimant through him has sought to recover
damages from a mineral owner or lessee on the theory of nuisance. Absent proof of
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theory, as mentioned above, although not really an independent
one, as it is essentially coextensive with the concept of unreasonable
or excessive surface use. The lessee is always given the right of
ingress and egress to the premises under an express provision of the
lease, and even if there is no express right, this right would be
implied in order that he be able to produce and enjoy the fruits of
his mineral interest.8 6 Since the lessee cannot be a trespasser on
land where he has the right to be, the trespass claim would
normally arise only when it is alleged that the lessee has used more
of the surface than he is entitled to.a A claim of surface damage
based on alleged excessive use of the surface, however, is fairly
difficult to sustain.
88
Negligence on the lessee's part is, therefore, the most
frequently asserted basis of liability for surface damages. Typical
situations arise when there has been one of the following: Overflow
from salt water disposal pits; failure to warn the surface owner in
advance about impending drilling operations so that he can take
negligence, breach of a duty imposed by statute or valid order of a regulatory agency,
or conduct giving rise to the application of the doctrine of liability without fault,
recovery has usually been denied in such cases.
Id. The nuisance concept is more common in connection with claims by adjoining landowners.
Bennett. supra note 71, at 41. The present Article does not purport to deal with the question of
damage to the surface ofadjacent tracts owned by other landowners, although many of the principles
discussed herein are applicable. See 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 217.
The question of what constitutes a nuisance is an elusive one, as Professor Prosser points out:
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word "nuisance." It has meant all things to all men, and has been
applied indiscriminately to everything front an alarming advertisement to a cockroach
baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or
comprehensive definition. Few terms have afforded so excellent an illustration of the
familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catchword as a substitute for any
analysis of a problem; the defendant's interference with the plaintiff's interests is
characterized as a "nuisance," and there is nothing more to be said.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
North Dakota defines "nuisance" by statute, although the definition is broad and quite general,
providing in relevant part that a nuisance is any act or omission of performance of a duty which
"laInnoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others," or renders persons
"insecure in life or in the use of property." N.D. CENT. CODE S 42-01-01 (1968). It is not necessary,
of course, to prove negligence in order to establish that a nuisance has been created. Thorson v. City
of Minot, 153 N.W.2d 764, 770 (N.D. 1967). Negligent acts, on the other hand, may result in the
creation of a nuisance, the distinction being that negligence is based on a lack of due care, whereas
liability for maintaining a nuisance exists regardless of the degree of care or skill exercised to avoid it.
Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin. 79 N.D. 495, 510. 57 N.W.2d 588, 596 (1953).
86. Davis, supra note 77, at 354.
87. Note, Prstection for Surface Owners sfFederally Reserved Mineral Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L.
REv. 171, 183-84(1973).
88. See.Jones, supra note 50, at 342. As the author notes:
Courts seem to be reluctant to hold a mineral lessee liable in money damages unless it
is obvious that he has cleared much more of the surface than was or could conceivably
have been used in connection with his well site, roads and pits and tank battery area,
all of which are necessary to his operations.
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steps to keep his livestock away from danger; the presence of open
tanks or other impoundments of poisonous materials which might
injure livestock; failure to protect against the escape of gas or other
substances from the well bore; breaking of salt water disposal lines;
or leaking and accumulation of oil in pools in the vicinity of storage
tanks. 89 The test to be applied is the usual one in negligence theory,
essentially whether a reasonably prudent operator might have
avoided reasonably foreseeable surface damage. There is an
additional proviso, however, in that it is recognized that some
surface damage is normally inevitable, so that it is really a question
of whether reasonably foreseeable excessive surface damage could
have been avoided. The blending between the question of
negligence and that of excessive surface use is apparent here
because the test of reasonably necessary surface use is what a
reasonably prudent operator would do in the circumstances. 90 The
traditional dominance of the mineral estate should still prevail to
defeat a claim of negligence or excessive surface use even when the
lessee is using the surface in a manner that causes substantial
damage or interference with the surface owner's desired use, if the
lessee is prudently employing the only method that can reasonably
be used to produce the minerals. A frequent source of current
litigation is damage alleged to have been caused by geophysical
exploration, particularly seismic tests. For example, it is often
claimed that damage to water wells has resulted from blasting
operations on the land. It may be, however, that this is the only
feasible method by which the exploration can be carried out. It is
not the seismic operations per se, therefore, that give rise to any
liability, but rather whether they have been prudently carried out
and whether they were reasonably necessary. 91
The final basis for liability that may arise in surface damage
cases is strict liability or negligence per se, based on breach of a
statutory duty or violation of an administrative rule or regulation.
9 2
This occurs most frequently in the case of pollution of the surface
89. 1 WI.LIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 5, § 218. 10, at 232-34. Damages to the surface by leaks
and spills of products and damage to livestock, usually as a result of the livestock's drinking wastes or
other poisonous substances or being injured by contact with machinery, are the most frequent kinds
of negligence claim..Jones, supra note 50, at 343. It is generally held that there is no duty on the part
of the lessee to fence offhis operating area, and livestock which wander into the area and suffer injury
are regarded as trespassers. Browder, supra note 51, at 106-07; Cray, supra note 47, at 267.
90. Gray, supra note 47, at 268-69.
91. Leases usually grant the lessee the right to carry on geophysical explorations, but in any case
this right, including the right to conduct seismographic operations, is implied. I WILLIAMS & MEYERS
supra note 5, § 218.5. In North Dakota a person engaging in geophysical exploration must file a bond
with the Industrial Commission for the purpose of indemnifying property owners against physical
damage to property from the exploration. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08.1-03.1 (Supp. 1981).
92. Bennett, supra note 71, at 42-43; Jones, supra note 50, at 344-48; Keeton &.Jones, supra note
74, at 7-11.
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by the escape of deleterious substances, such as overflow from salt
water disposal pits. 93 The lessee has the implied, if not express,
right to maintain salt water disposal pits as a necessary part of his
operation, but by virtue of statute or regulation prohibiting
overflow and pollution, he may be deemed to have assumed the risk
of any escape of the substance onto the surrounding surface.
IV. NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
Having outlined both the general law on the relative rights of
the surface owner and the oil and gas developer, and the theories
that may provide a basis for liability for surface damages, it is
appropriate to review the North Dakota cases that have dealt with
these questions. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has
not had frequent occasion to deal with these issues, its most recent
decision, Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh,94 has attracted considerable
attention as an example of a court's seeking to reach an
"accommodation" between the rights of the mineral owner and
surface owner.
95
Another case, Klokstad v. Ward,96 deals more with procedural
matters than with the substantive law of the relationship between
mineral owner and surface owner, but it is interesting as an
example of the application of several of the theories of liability de-
scribed above. In Klokstad a pumping oil well on the plaintiff's land
was producing salt water with the oil, and treatment equipment
was installed at the well site in order to separate the salt water.
After separation the salt water was diverted to a disposal pit near
the well. The court noted that the destructive nature of salt water
subjects its disposal to regulatory control. 97 The surface owner
brought an action for damages to growing crops, which occurred
during preparation of a well site by the lessee, and for permanent
damage to the surface, alleging negligence in the failure to
construct the salt water pit in accordance with the regulation,
thereby allowing salt water to escape and flow on the surface. The
93. See, e..., Jones. Escape of Deleterious Substances: Strict Liability vs. Liability Based Upon Fault, I
RocKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 163 (1955); Sellers, supra note 48, at 391-96.
94. 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
95. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
96. 131 N.W. 2d 244 (N.D. 1964).
97. Klokstad v. Ward, 131 N.W.2d 244. 245 (N.D. 1964). "Salt water is destructive to
vegetation and poisonous to livestock and may cause land over which it is permitted to flow to
become permanently unfit for agricultural purposes. For this reason the disposal of salt water is
regulated by the Industrial Commission of the State of North Dakota.- Id. The present regulation
provides that all saltwater produced with oil and natural gas must be disposed of without pollution of
freshwater supplies and that saltwater shall not be allowed to flow over the surface or into streams.
N.D. ADMttN. CODE § 43-02-03-53 (1982).
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trial court had instructed the jury on the various requirements
under the Industrial Commission regulation regarding the design
of salt water handling facilities,98 including the requirement for a
continuous embankment surrounding the pit so that salt water or
brine could not be allowed to overflow. In this case there was no
embankment and exceptionally heavy rains and the presence of a
nearby slough caused water to flow into and out of the pit, carrying
salt water with it. The plaintiff alleged that the resulting salt water
saturation permanently damaged some ten or twelve acres and cut
off another nine or ten acre tract from the balance of his farm. The
jury returned a verdict in the surface owner's favor for a small
amount of damage to growing crops and for a reduction in the
value of twelve acres. 99
Klokstad does not expressly delve into the nature of the legally
protected rights of the surface and mineral owner as bearing upon
the question of the lessee's liability for the damage, which seems to
have been taken for granted. Recovery on the claim for crop
damage was based on contract, on an express lease provision. 100 As
discussed above, liability for this damage, once it occurs, is
automatic since the lessee is bound to pay under the provision in
question, so long as the necessary causal chain is established. 01
The claim for salt water damage in Klokstad was based on
negligence, and presumably, the surface owner carried his burden
of proving the requisite elements for recovery on that basis. 1 02 The
question of negligence per se or strict liability for breach of the
Industrial Commission regulation requiring an embankment for
the salt water pit does not appear to have been raised. The lack of
mention of these theories in the opinion does not necessarily mean
that they were not implicit in the case, however, and one may
surmise that the fact of violation of the regulation may have
influenced the jury's thinking on the negligence issue.
The first case in which the North Dakota Supreme Court dealt
98. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-53 (1982),
99. Klokstad, 131 N.W.2d at 245-47. Damages were assessed in the amount of $42.75 for crop
damage and $600 for damage to the land itself. Id. at 246. The court inferred that this meant the jury
had accepted the defendants' evidence of"$50 per acre damage to twelve acres. Id. at 247.
100. Id. at 245 ("The plaintiff sued for damage to growing crops that occurred when one of the
well sites was prepared under the provisions of the lease.").
101. Seesupra note 81 and accompanying text.
102. 131 N.W.2d at 245 ("He also sued for permanent damage to his land resulting from
alleged negligence in permitting salt water to flow upon it, caused by failure to construct the salt
water pit in accordance with the regulation."). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may also be available
in a negligence action based on escape of deleterious substances. The question would be whether
escape of the salt water or other substance does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. See
Keeton &.Jones, supra note 74, at 15-19. One may surmise from the amount of the verdict in Klokstad
that thejury did not deem the damage to be extensive and permanent. An earlier verdict for $2300 in
the first trial of the case was set aside by the trial court as excessive and unsupported by the evidence.
131 N.W.2d at 246.
480
SURFACE DAMAGES
squarely with the respective legal rights of the surface owner and
the mineral owner was Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co.,103 decided in
1957. The action did not involve any claim of negligence, but was
based simply on breach of contract on the part of the lessee. The
plaintiff surface owner was also the lessor; therefore, he could rely
directly on the lease provisions for protection. The lease contained
the usual clause, discussed above, providing for payment by the
lessee of damages to growing crops resulting from drilling
operations. The plaintiff alleged that the well site and
approximately three adjacent acres had been damaged by the
passage of heavy machinery, by the discarding of debris and refuse
by workers, and by the intermingling of the topsoil with underlying
clay strata, impairing agricultural productivity for many years. It
was further claimed that growing crops on the well site and
adjacent lands had been partially destroyed by the drilling
operations. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff,
both for damage to the growing crops and for damage to the value
of the land.
1 0 4
The actual language of the lease does not appear in the
opinion, but it may be presumed that it contained a more or less
standard granting clause giving the lessee the exclusive right to
explore, drill for and produce oil and gas and related products,
engage in secondary recovery, install pipe lines, build storage tanks
and other structures, and build access roads to produce, process,
treat, store, and transport the products extracted. t0 5 The court
implicitly approved the trial court's charge to the jury as to the
general rights of the lessee, 10 6 and held that such a lease gave the
lessee the right to make reasonably necessary use of the surface:
"The oil and gas lease was the contract between the parties. Under
its terms the defendant had the right to use so much of the land as
was reasonably necessary in the operation of drilling the test
well. 1107
There was no allegation in the complaint that the lessee had
103 85 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 1957).
104, Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 85 N.W.2d 246, 247-48 (N.D. 1957).
105. This is the usual kind of language appearing in the fairly standard type of "Producers 88"
lease widely used in the Rocky Mountain area, including North Dakota. See 2 E. BROWN, THE LAW
Or OIL & GAS LEASES § 18.02, at 18-122 (1973); Anderson, David v. Goliath: Negotiating the "Lessor's
88" and Representing Lessors and Surface Owners in Oil and Gas Lease Plays, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
1029 (1982).
106. 85 N.W.2d at 250. The trial court had instructed the jury that the lessee had the right
under the lease to ingress and egress, and to the reasonable use of the surface "as to all matters
defined in the granting clause," with the right to use as much of the surface and in such manner as to
accomplish the purpose of the lease. Id. The limitations on the lessee were to proceed in such manner
"that no substantial injury shall be done . . . through any negligence or wilful misconduct on its
part." Id.
107. Id.
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used more land than was reasonably necessary for its operations,
nor was there any evidence to that effect.' 0 8 Implicit in the court's
analysis was the recognition that some surface damage to the land
was necessarily contemplated by the lease.10 9 It was held improper,
therefore, to have instructed the jury to assess separately the
damage to growing crops and the damage to the land itself. The
only damages allowable were those found to have been caused to
growing crops, for which the lessee had expressly agreed to pay
under the lease clause:
The plaintiffs neither pleaded nor proved that defendant
used more land than was reasonably necessary, and
therefore they are not entitled to damages on that ground.
However, we think the evidence is sufficient to sustain the
verdict in so far as it allows damages for the destruction of
growing crops. I10
Bell, then, may be understood to stand for the proposition that
while damages to growing crops may be recovered under an express
lease clause, reasonably necessary modes of surface use are
permitted without liability on the part of the lessee for resulting
surface damage when he has not used more land than reasonably
necessary. The holding is entirely consistent, therefore, with the
general law on the subject discussed above. "'
In Feland v. Placid Oil Co. 112 the North Dakota Supreme Court
was again faced with a case involving salt water disposal problems,
and this time the respective rights of the lessee and the surface
owner were necessarily treated in some detail. The principal issue
in the case was the effect of a nine-month cessation of production
from a well after the primary term of the lease, when continuation
108. Id. at 250-51. The lessee had arranged to have its drilling equipment moved onto the well
site, which occupied about three-fourths of an acre, had cut down the side of a steep hill to make a
level surface for the equipment and done grading on the hill to construct an access road, and had dug
mud pits and a sump hole. Other work necessary for drilling of the well was also performed. Id. at
249.
109. Id. at 251. Rejecting the plaintiff's claim of reduction in value of the land itself, the court
observed that "there is no evidence showing any damage in excess of that contemplated by the
lease." Id.
110. d It is interesting to note that the trial court had instructed the jury that native grasses
were not "growing crops. " Id. at 248. But see supra note 81. The court mentions in the opinion that
the lessee caused the mud pits, sump hole, and other excavations to be properly filled and leveled off
to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs after drilling was completed and the equipment removed. Id. at
249. One can only speculate, however, whether this fact had any influence on the decision.
111. Bennett, supra note 71, at 46. Citing the Belldecision, Bennett discerns a "cautious trend"
by the courts toward looking more favorably upon surface owners' claims than was traditionally the
case. Id. The Bell holding, however, appears to lie solidly within the mainstream of traditional law on
the subject.
112. 171 N.W.2d829(N.D. 1969).
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of the lease depended, under the standard "thereafter" clause, on
the production of oil or gas from the well. The well was shut in
because the salt water disposal pit was filled, but after nine months
production was resumed when evaporation of water in the pit
sufficiently lowered the water level. The lessors, surface owners
who had refused permission to dig a second disposal pit, sought to
terminate the lease based on the lack of production during this
period. They took the somewhat anomalous position, citing Bell,
that the lessee should have dug a second disposal pit at the site,
despite their refusal as surface owners to consent. 
11 3
The court held that under the grant in the lease, which
contained the usual kind of language, 11 4 the lessee was entitled to
construct an additional salt water disposal pit at the site if it was
"necessary, incident to or convenient for the economical
operation" of production of oil." 5 The court stated that this
criterion of being "necessary, incident to or convenient for"
operation of the well was established by the request from the lessee
for permission to construct the additional disposal pit, given the
undisputed fact that it was not economically feasible to connect to
the nearest disposal well. 11 6 The lessee's power to dig a second pit
derived from his rights under the lease itself, which necessarily
carries with it the right to possession of the surface to the extent
reasonably necessary to allow the lessee to perform the obligations
and enjoy the rights he has acquired. 1 7 The lessee's right to
reasonably necessary use of the surface, therefore, includes the
right to use of the space needed for salt water confinement
facilities.' 18
Although the Feland court stressed that it was dealing with
rights expressly granted by the lease, it cited with approval a Texas
case stating the traditional principle discussed above, that the grant
of the lease itself vests the lessee with a dominant mineral estate and
the implied right to use of the surface to the extent required to fully
enjoy the fruits of his interest.' 19 Either as an express power or as an
implied power, therefore, the lessee in Feland had the right to
113. Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 831-32 (N.D. 1969).
114. Seesupra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. 171 N.W. 2d at 832. The quoted language is taken from the granting clause of the lease.
116. Id. at 833. There was no question in this case ofa violation of the Industrial Commission
rule on salt water disposal facilities, as the court stated that the existing pit conformed to the rule. Id.
at 832.
117. Id. at 834. The court notes that in this particular case the operator's rights were based not
on implied rights, but rather on expressly granted rights "including the broad authorization to 'all
other rights and privileges necessary, incident to, or convenient' for economical operation and
production ofoil." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Faris, 413 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)).
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construct a second disposal pit on the surface, and the refusal of the
lessors to consent was of no legal significance. 120
The rights of the oil and gas lessee or other operator to all
reasonably necessary uses of the surface, whether by express grant
or through implication, were thus clearly established in Bell and
Feland. In several subsequent cases involving other minerals the
court reaffirmed this right on the part of the mineral owner and
touched on the troublesome questions that arise when the method
of mineral extraction may require substantial surface
destruction." 1  In Christman v. Emineth,1 22  a decision which
confirmed the mineral owner's right to reasonably necessary use of
the surface, one of the issues considered was whether coal was
included within a 1943 reservation in a deed that reserved to the
grantor fifty per cent of its interest in "oil, gas and other
minerals." The reservation also retained in the grantor "such
easement for ingress, egress and use of the surface as may be
incidental or necessary" to enjoyment of his rights. 123 An argument
was made that the references to "ingress and egress" and "use of
surface" meant that the grantor was to have some rights, but that it
could not have been intended to give the right to completely destroy
the surface and nullify its agricultural value by the strip mining of
coal. Therefore, the argument went, coal must not have been
intended to be included within the reservation of "other minerals."
The court observed that this problem had been foreseen by the
legislature and dealt with through the surface mining reclamation
statutes requiring restoration of the surface after strip mining. 124
Therefore, the surface destruction problem was not an
impediment, and the court held that coal was to be included within
the reservation. 1
25
120. 171 N.W.2d at 834. The balance of the opinion in Feland is not germane to the subject
matter under consideration here. Having held that the lessee had the power to dig the second pit, the
court went on to consider whether the lessee had exercised reasonable diligence and good faith in
restoring production. The holding was in favor of the lessee, and therefore, the lease did not
terminate by reason of this temporary cessation of production. Id. at 834-37.
121. See supra note 57.
122. 212 N. W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
123. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 546 (N.D. 1973).
124. Id. at 551. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-14.1 (1979 & Supp. 1981) (entitled "Surface
Mining and Reclamation Operations").
125. 212 N.W.2d at 549-51. In MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 39, 42 (N.D. 1957), the
court determined that the term "other minerals" in a lease covering oil, gas, casinghead gas,
casinghead gasoline, and all other minerals did not include uranium. By way of' dictum the court
went on to suggest that "the class of minerals conveyed by a mineral deed is limited to those which
are valuable, are not a part of the soil and may be mined without destroying the surface." Id. at 42-
43. The court in AMacMaster relied on § 47-10-24 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides
that in a mineral conveyance coal, clay, uranium, and gravel are not included unless the intent to do
so is made clear and that in a lease only minerals specifically named are covered. N.D. CENT. CODE §
47-10-24 (1978). In Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40, 44 (N.D. 1975), the court suggested that the
purpose of this statute was to prevent leases or conveyances of mineral interests for oil and gas
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The court reaffirmed the Christman decision in Olson v.
Dillerud,12 6 although expressing some doubt as to whether strip-
mined lands can be restored to productive use. In Trauger v. Helm
Bros.,127 which involved an attempt to terminate a lease for the
extraction of rock, sand, and gravel, the plaintiffs sought to rely on
the fact of surface destruction and the lack of any applicable surface
reclamation law as a basis for termination of the lease. 2 8 There was
no question about what substances were covered by the lease,
however, and the court gave short shrift to the argument that the
surface destruction resulting from extracting these substances
should affect the validity of the lease. 129 The difficulty of extraction
without surface damage or destruction was recently noted by the
court in Hoyden v. Lind,130 however, only as a rationale for
excluding clay and scoria from the meaning of the term "all other
exploration from being "transmuted into a license to exploit the surface estate, with the concomitant
destruction of same."
This question also arises in cases involving instruments predating sections 47-10-24 and 47-10-
25 of the North Dakota Century Code, the latter of which provides that a reservation of minerals
includes only those specifically named in the instrument. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (1978)
(enacted in 1955); see also id. S 47-10-25 (1978) (enacted in 1975).Thus, in Lee v. Frank, 313 N.W.2d
733, 737 (N.D. 1981), the court construed the phrase "all ores and minerals" in a 1945 reservation
and held that all metallic minerals and ores, plus all nonmetallic solid, liquid, or gaseous minerals
were included "except insofar as it may be interpreted in a manner to defeat the conveyance of the
soil itself."
126. 226 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D, 1975). The court also urged legislative action if required:
Recent events have raised doubts in the minds of some as to whether strip-mined
lands have been, or can be, restored to productive use. Ifa case should come before us
in the future, based on factual data in evidence, as to whether strip mining constitutes
"use" as distinguished from destruction of, or permanent damage to, the surface, it
may be necessary to reexamine the language of Christman ...
Because of possible consequences of inadequate restoration of the surface
following strip mining of coal, we urge the Legislature to take whatever steps may be
reasonably necessary to insure that the surface is restored for agricultural and
ranching purposes.
Olson v. Dillerud, 226 N.W.2d 363, 367 (N.D. 1975).
127. 279 N.W.2d 406 (N.D. 1979).
128. Trauger v. Helm Bros.. 279 N.W.2d 406. 407,411 (N.D. 1979).
129, Id. at 411. The Trattger court reasoned as follows:
The fact that surface mining for sand, gravel, and rock is not governed by those Acts
[Reclamation of Surface-Mined Lands and Surface Owner Protection Act] does not,
however, affect the validity of the lease between the Traugers and Helm Bros. Many
leases involving surface mining for various minerals or substances were executed
before and after those Acts became effective, and the validity of those leases is not
dependent upon provisions for restoration of the premises in the lease or legislation
requiring such restoration. The Legislature deemed it necessary to enact certain
statutes involving the surface mining of coal, and, in so doing, limited the application
of those Acts to coal. Whether it is necessary for the Legislature to enact similar
legislation for the surface mining of sand, gravel, and rock is a decision for the
Legislature.
Id.
130. 301 N.W.2d 374 (-N.D. 1981). The court also based its conclusion on evidence of the
parties' intent and the observation that substances like gravel, clay, and scoria are not usually
classified as minerals because they are not rare or highly valuable. Hovden v. Lind, 301 N.W.2d
374, 378 (N.D. 1981).
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minerals" used in a reservation in a contract for the sale of land. 131
The most recent decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court
dealing with the conflict between the surface owner and the mineral
owner, and one that has attracted considerable notice, is Hunt Oil
Co. v. Kerbaugh'32 The case is unusual in that it is an action
brought by lessees to restrain surface owners from interfering with
their rights, rather than an action by surface owners for damages
caused by a lessee. The lessees contracted for seismic exploration
work to be carried out on the leased premises and sought
permission from the surface owner, who owned no interest in the
severed minerals, to conduct the exploration, offering
compensation on a per hole basis and offering to pay for damages to
growing crops. Upon the surface owner's refusal to permit the
exploration activities the lessees sought and obtained temporary
injunctive relief.' 33 In response to the surface owner's argument
that the lessees did not have an unlimited right to conduct seismic
exploration, the court stated that in Christman 34 it had adopted the
general rule as to the implied rights of the mineral estate owner,
that "a grant of mines or minerals gives to the owner of the
minerals the incidental right of entering, occupying, and making
such use of the surface lands as is reasonably necessary in
exploring, mining, removing, and marketing the minerals." 135 The
court also noted that it had held this principle applicable to oil and
gas leases in Feland v. Placid Oil Co. 136 The basis for those holdings
was the well-settled rule that the severed mineral estate is
dominant:
The mineral estate is dominant in that the law implies,
where it is not granted, a legitimate area within which
mineral ownership of necessity carries with it inherent
surface rights to find and develop the minerals, which
rights must and do involve the surface estate. Without
such rights the mineral estate would be meaningless and
worthless. Thus, the surface estate is servient in the sense
it is charged with the servitude for those essential rights of
the mineral estate. 1
37
131. 301 N.W.2d at 378.
132. 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
133. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (N.D. 1979).
134. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
135. 283 N.W.2d at 134-35 (quoting 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 159b (1948)). The court






The usual limitations on the lessee's rights are applicable; he
may use so much of the surface and in such manner as is reasonably
necessary to explore, develop, and transport the minerals, and he
must exercise due regard for the rights of the surface owner. 138 The
requirement of giving due regard to the surface owner's rights is a
factor in analyzing whether the mineral owner's surface use is
reasonably necessary, as established by the "accommodation
doctrine" set out in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones. 139 Citing a Utah decision
that adopted the Getty accommodation doctrine, 140 the court stated
that it was adopting the doctrine in North Dakota as well. 14 1 It is
important to bear in mind that the accommodation doctrine
adopted in Hunt is not a pure balancing test in which the harm and
benefits to the severed mineral owner and the surface owner are
weighed against each other. On the contrary, the issue is the
existence of reasonable alternative methods which the mineral
owner may be able to use. 
142
The accomodation doctrine as approved in Hunt is perhaps
best described as a "modified" balancing test. The court described
it as follows:
We agree a pure balancing test is not involved under
the accommodation doctrine where no reasonable
alternatives are available. Where alternatives do exist,
138. Id. The court also observed that the mineral owner has no right to act negligently or to
wantonly use the surface. Id. Whether the mineral owner's surface use is reasonably necessary is a
question of fact, for which the surface owner bears the burden of proof. Id. at 137.
139. Id. at 136. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
140. Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) (stating that surface owner
and mineral owner should each have the "right to the use and enjoyment of his interest in the
property to the highest degree possible not inconsistent with the rights of the other").
141. 283 N.W.2d at 136. The essence of that doctrine, as set out in Gety and quoted by the court
in Hunt is as follows:
The reasonableness of a surface use by the lessee is to be determined by a
consideration of the circumstances of both and, as stated, the surface owner is under
the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of the lessee's surface use in this light.
The reasonableness of the method and manner of using the dominant mineral estate
may be measured by what are usual, customary and reasonable practices in the
industry under like circumstances of time, place and servient estate uses ... [11f the
manner of use selected by the dominant mineral lessee is the only reasonable, usual
and customary method that is available for developing and producing the minerals on
the particular land then the owner of the servient estate must yield. However, if there
are other usual, customary and reasonable methods practiced in the industry on
similar lands put to similar uses which would not interfere with the existing uses being
made by the servient surface owner, it could be unreasonable for the lessee to employ
an interfering method or manner of use.
Id. at 136-37 (quoting Getty Oil Co. v..ones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 627-28 (Tex. 1971)).
142. Id. at 137. Thus, the effect on the surface owner is not the determining factor unless
reasonable alternatives do exist.
ITIhe test is the availability of alternative non-conflicting uses of the two types of
owners. Inconvenience to the surface owner is not the controlling element where no
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however, the concepts of due regard and reasonable
necessity do require a weighing of the different
alternatives against the inconveniences to the surface
owner. Therefore, once alternatives are shown to exist a
balancing of the mineral and surface owner's interest does
occur. 143
The acceptance of this doctrine, with its modified balancing test,
has been characterized as a "new doctrinal journey" tentatively
embarked upon by the courts. 144 While it certainly will provide a
point of departure from which a surface owner may seek to launch
his case, 145 it is probably premature to suggest that any substantial
change has been wrought in the traditional law governing the
relative rights of mineral owner and surface owner.
As discussed above, it is unlikely that the Getty decision itself
constituted a marked departure from traditional principles. 146 This
doctrine does give the surface owner the opportunity to
demonstrate that a reasonable and feasible alternative exists by
which the mineral owner can develop his interest. He has the
burden, however, to establish this fact, and it may be questioned
whether he is in any different position than before the Hunt
decision. For example, under traditional theory, as expressed in
Feland v. Placid Oil Co., the surface owner bears the burden of
proving that the mineral owner's use of the surface is not
reasonably necessary. Presumably, the best method for meeting
this burden is to demonstrate that there are reasonable alternatives
that the mineral owner may use instead, which is the same showing
he would be trying to make under the Hunt accommodation
doctrine. The change is really a matter of emphasis or degree,
rather than a matter of a change in the law. Theoretically, after
Hunt the surface owner's rights may be given more prominence in
the analytical framework applied to the surface damage question,
but it seems unlikely that Hunt will suddenly result in large
reasonable alternatives are available to the mineral owner or lessee. The surface owner
must show that under the circumstances, the use of the surface under attack is not
reasonably necessary.
Id.
143. Id. The stress on alternatives has led some to refer to the accommodation doctrine as the
"doctrine of alternative means." E.g., Note, The Surface Mineral Producer v. the Oil and Gas Producer: A
Need for Peaceful Coexistence, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 907, 923 (1977).
144. Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs. Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 995, 1010(1980).
145. Id. "In the future, counsel for surface owners may be expected to unsheath Getty, Flying
Diamond, and Hunt to undercut precedents favoring the mineral estate." Id. See Note, supra note 143,
at 928.
146. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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numbers of surface owners being able to prevail in cases that would
have been unsuccessful prior to the decision. 
147
Potentially much more revolutionary than the adoption of the
accommodation doctrine is the language regarding the question of
damages that is buried in a footnote in the Hunt opinion. 48 The
case involved injunctive relief only, so damages were not directly in
issue. In dicta, however, the court discussed the matter of
compensation for surface damage and expressly left open the
question whether the surface owner might be entitled to recovery
even when the lessee's use of the surface had been reasonably
necessary:
This case does not present, nor does this opinion
decide, the issue of whether or not the owner or lessee of
the mineral estate is liable for damages arising from the
reasonably necessary use of the surface incident to the
exploration, development, and transportation of the
minerals. The authorities which have considered the issue
appear to be in agreement that such damages are damnum
absque injuria and no recovery can be had against the
mineral estate owner or lessee .... This conclusion seems
to rest on a principle that injury necessarily inflicted in
the exercise of a lawful right does not create liability, but
rather, the injury must be the direct result of the
commission of a wrong. . . . We question, however, the
social desirability of a rule which potentially allows the
damage or destruction of a surface estate equal or greater
in value than the value of the mineral being extracted.
• . . Equity requires a closer examination of whether
or not the cost of surface damage and destruction arising
from mineral development should be borne by the owner
of a severed surface estate or by the developer and
147. 283 N.W.2d at 135. It is important to keep in mind that the Hunt court expressly confirmed
that the dominance of the mineral estate is "the well-settled rule." Id. The import of the
accommodation doctrine is summarized well in Gray, A New Appraisal of the Rights of Lessees Under Oil
and Gas Leases to Use and Occupy the Surface, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 227 (1975). Gray states the
following:
The due regard concept means, among other things, that considering the alternatives
available on the leased premises, a proposed surface use may have to be "more
necessary" under some circumstances than under others. In the final analysis,
however, if accomplishment of the lease purposes requires a particular use that cannot
be reconciled with the lessor's wishes, the leasehold estate, it is submitted, is still the
dominant one and will prevail.
Id. at 269.
148. 283 N.W.2d at 135-36 n.4.
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consumer of the minerals. Although we do not doubt the
mineral estate owner's right to use the surface estate to
explore, develop and transport the minerals, we
specifically do not decide if the right of reasonable use also
implies the right to damage and destroy without
compensation. 1
49
If the court has embarked on a new doctrinal journey in Hunt
it surely arises from this startling language. To allow the surface
owner compensation for reasonably necessary surface damage by
the lessee in the absence of negligence or any of the other normal
bases of liability would reverse the traditional roles of mineral estate
and surface estate and would make the lessee strictly liable as an
insurer for all surface damage. It cannot simply be taken for
granted that the court intended to suggest such a revolutionary
concept. It is submitted that the court would still require some
definite basis for liability, such as negligence or fault of some kind.
Thus, while a particular use by the lessee may be allowed as a
reasonably necessary use so that he could not be enjoined by the
surface owner from so using the surface, it is possible that in the
course of such use the lessee might be negligent or might create a
nuisance. It is apparent that the court was contemplating cases of
severe surface damage in its declaration, since its concern was
premised on the problem of a rule which could allow the damage or
destruction of a surface as valuable or more valuable than the
extracted minerals. Such a situation would be unusual in the
context of North Dakota oil and gas development.' 50 It seems
probable, moreover, that such extensive surface damage would
normally not occur in the absence of negligence, breach of a statute
or regulation, or some other acts that would give rise to liability for
damages under the usual theories.
It is premature, therefore, despite this dicta, to suppose that
the Hunt court approved the concept of liability for surface damages
arising from reasonably necessary use of the surface by the oil and
gas lessee. Although the surface owner in Hunt did testify that he
suffered damages from the seismic exploration,' 5' Hunt was an
action for injunctive relief by the lessee, not an action for surface
149. 283 N.W.2d at 135 n.4. (citations omitted).
150. Presumably, cases in which the surface might be more valuable than the underlying
minerals would arise more readily in a more urban state where the surface was proposed to be used
for a commercial or industrial project of some kind. Oil and gas exploration and production in North
Dakota occurs largely in sparsely populated areas.
151. The surface owner claimed damages because a spring, which supplied water to his home
and livestock, had stopped producing, and open holes and debris were left on the property. 283
N. W.2d at 133.
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damages. The court upheld a temporary injunction against
interference with the lessee's activities on the grounds that the
surface owner had failed to meet his burden of proof under the
accommodation doctrine:
The oil companies were not required to show their
proposed activities were the most reasonable or even that
other alternatives were unreasonable in the absence of the
Kerbaughs' bringing the reasonableness of other
alternatives into issue. The oil companies had the right to
use the surface in exploring for their minerals. They also
had the right to seek an injunction preventing the
Kerbaughs from interfering with the right of exploration.
It was the Kerbaughs' burden to show the proposed
activities were unreasonable by reason of the existence of
other alternatives.
In summary, the Kerbaughs, as the owners of the
servient surface, failed to show the proposed exploration
activities of the oil companies were not reasonably
necessary as to prevent the issuance of a temporary
injunction. 152
V. STATUTORY REMEDY FOR SURFACE DAMAGES
The enactment of the North Dakota Oil and Gas Production
Damage Compensation Act (Act) 53 in 1979, which has not yet
been construed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, bears directly
on the question whether the law of North Dakota has gone so far as
to impose liability without fault for surface damage caused by
reasonably necessary use of the surface by the lessee. The Act
begins quite broadly by stating that surface owners "should be
justly compensated for injury to their persons or property and
interference with the use of their property occasioned by oil and gas
development' '1 54 and that the purpose is to "provide the maximum
amount of constitutionally permissible protection" to surface
owners from the results of oil and gas development.155 The crucial
provisions relating to damages provide in relevant part:
152. Id. at 139-40.
153. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-11.1 (1980). Montana enacted a statute based on the North
Dakota Act in 1981. MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501 to -511 (1981). South Dakota has also enacted a
statute, effective July 1, 1982, that is essentially identical to the North Dakota Act, except that it
covers other minerals as'well as oil and gas. S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. ch. 45-5A(Supp. 1982).
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-01(3).
155. Id. § 38-11.1-02.
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The mineral developer shall pay the surface owner a sum
of money equal to the amount of damages sustained by
the surface owner for loss of agricultural production and
income, lost land value, and lost value of improvements
caused by drilling operations. 1
56
The mineral developer shall be responsible for all
damages to person or property, real or personal, resulting
from the lack of ordinary care by the mineral developer.
The mineral developer shall also be responsible for all
damages to person or property, real or personal, resulting
from a nuisance caused by drilling operations. 1
5
1
The question that presents itself at the outset is whether these
two provisions are interdependent or whether they provide for
separate forms of surface damage liability, one incorporating the
element of fault, section 38-11.1-06 of the North Dakota Century
Code, and the other being a form of strict liability, section 38-11.1-
04 of the North Dakota Century Code. Since all parts of an act
must be read together and harmonized with each other,1 58 it would
appear that Section 38-11.1-06 specifies when liability will arise:
when there is lack of ordinary care, or when a nuisance has been
created.15 9 Section 38-11.1-04 then specifies what the damage
compensation shall cover when one of these occasions of liability
does arise: loss of agricultural production and income, lost land
value, and loss of improvement values.160 In other words, one of
the traditional bases of liability for surface damage must still exist.
A surface owner may argue that Section 38-11.1-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides for absolute liability, with its
provision that the lessee "shall pay . . . a sum . . . equal to the
amount of damages sustained, ''6 1 and that Section 38-11.1-06 of
the North Dakota Century Code, by its heading, relates to "other
responsibilites. ' '16 2 This argument, however, ignores the express
language of section 38-11.1-06, which specifies when the mineral
156. Id. 38-11.1-04 (section entitled "Surface damage and disruption payments").
157. Id. 38-11.1-06 (section entitled "Other responsibilities of mineral developer"). It is not
clear whether the word "other" refers back to § 38-11.1-04 of the North Dakota Century Code,
or whether it refers to the fact that some responsibilities of the mineral developer, such as giving
notice of drilling operations, are covered in the immediately preceding section, § 38-11.1-05 of the
North Dakota Century Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11.1-04, -05 (1980).
158. See Sheets v. Graco, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 63, 67-68 (N.D. 1980).
159. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-11.1-06 (1980).
160. Id. 5 38-11.1-04.
161. Id.
162. Id. 5 38-11.1I-06.
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developer "shall be responsible for damages.' ' 63 This theory
would also be inconsistent with the Hunt dicta discussed above,
1 64
since that opinion was rendered on August 2, 1979, after the
effective date of the Act, July 1, 1979. If the Act had created
absolute liability without fault for surface damages, the court surely
would have referred to that fact and discussed it in the Hunt
opinion, as that precise question was treated in the court's dicta on
damages. 165 That it did not do so suggests the court implicitly
recognized that the Act was not intended to be read so broadly as to
impose an absolute form of liability for surface damages.
An attempt to read the Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act as imposing any form of liability without fault
would also run the risk of violating the constitutional rights of the
mineral owner. The stated purpose of the Act is to provide the
maximum constitutionally permitted protection to the surface
owner. 1 66  It is submitted, however, that liability for surface
damages imposed on the operator without proven fault may
transgress constitutional limitations and constitute a taking of the
mineral owner's property without due process of law. 67  A
Kentucky court held that a statute that requires the consent of the
surface owner before mineral production can take place is
163. The headnote of a statutory section is not part of the statute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-12
(1975).
164. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 n.4 (N.D. 1979).
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-02 (1980).
167. This would be an entirely different matter than the question of liability without fault for
breach of a duty imposed by statute or administrative rule. In that case, while there may have been
no "fault" in the negligence sense of a lack of ordinary care, there has been fault in the failure to
abide by the statute or rule enacted under the police power of the state. The offending mineral owner
would not be paying for the right to extract his minerals but rather would be paying for the damages
resulting from his having violated the statute or rule. The fact of the violation serves as the evidence
of culpability. The question of this kind of strict liability has not arisen in North Dakota in surface
damage cases decided by the supreme court, although a breach of an Industrial Commission rule
did occur in Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co. See supra note 104 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Bell case.
Industrial Commission rules provide for jurisdiction over a number of areas of surface damage
and reclamation. E.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-06 (1982) (prohibiting leak or escape of oil or
gas from a natural reservoir or from wells or equipment, although the focus of this rule is on the
prevention of waste, in the sense of loss of oil or gas); id. § 43-02-03-07 (requiring compliance with
federal requlations on United States government lands); id. § 43-02-03-15 (requiring a drilling and
plugging bond and specifying that approved plugging "shall also include practical restoration of the
well site"); id. § 43-02-03-19 (requiring the operator to provide a pit for drilling mud and drill
cuttings, which must be constructed so as not to allow surface or subsurface contamination or flow
from the pit, and providing that the pit shall be leveled and the surface restored within a reasonable
time after the well has been completed; also requiring stockpiling and redistribution of topsoil and
restoration of the surface after plugging or setting production casing); id. S 43-02-03-34 (requiring
plugging of abandoned wells and cutting offofcasing below plow depth); id. § 43-02-03-37 (requiring
the filling of all unnecessary pits within a reasonable time after completion of the well); id. S 43-02-
03-49 (prohibiting storage of oil in earthen reservoirs or open receptacles and requiring dikes or fire
walls around oil tanks and tank batteries when deemed necessary by the state geologist); id. 43-02-
03-53 (prohibiting saltwater liquids or brines from being allowed to flow over the surface or into
streams and setting standards for saltwater handling facilities); id. § 43-02-03-55 (requiring plugging
and site restoration on a deserted well).
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unconstitutional on those grounds. 68 The Oil and Gas Production
Damage Compensation Act would not be constitutionally invalid
on that precise basis because it does not require surface owner
consent for oil and gas development on the land. It does provide,
however, for mandatory compensation in any case in which it does
impose liability, since the surface owner may bring a court action
for compensation if the oil and gas developer's damage
compensation offer is rejected. 69 The 1975 North Dakota Surface
Owner Protection Act, 170 which applies to the strip mining of coal
and upon which this oil and gas statute is modeled, does require
surface owner consent, but seeks to avoid the constitutional
problem by providing a procedure by which the mineral developer
may obviate the consent requirement by bringing an action in the
district court.17' In any case the developer is required to pay the
surface owner damages for loss of agricultural production caused
by coal mining activity. 1
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A potential constitutional problem, however, appears to
persist under either Act. In effect, it is only a matter of degree
whether the mineral owner is prevented from producing his
minerals by a consent requirement or whether he is required to pay
additional compensation to the surface owner for the right to
produce them. In the one case he loses the full value of the minerals
and in the latter case he loses some part of their value, since his
proceeds are reduced by whatever amount is paid out to the surface
owner for surface damage caused by reasonably necessary surface
use. Conceptually, this amount cannot be regarded as simply an
expense of production because, in reality, it amounts to requiring
the mineral developer to pay twice for his mineral interest, first
168. Department for Natural Resources & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684, 686
(Ky. Ct. App. 1975). The Kentucky statute required consent of each holder of a freehold interest in
the surface before strip mining could be performed. Id. at 685.
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-09 (1980). In referring to "the amount of compensation
awarded by the court," this section seems to take for granted that the court will necessarily award
some compensation. The amount may be less than the mineral developer's offer, or it may be
greater. In the latter case the surface owner is also entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees, as
well as costs. Id. This provision suggests an analogy to a taking under the eminent domain statutes.
Cf N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-15 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
170. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-18 (1980 & Supp. 1981).
171. Upon a showing to the court that the surface owner will be adequately compensated for lost
production, lost land value, and loss of the value of improvements, the consent of the surface owner
will not be required. Id. S 38-18-06(5) (Supp. 1981). In North Am. Coal Corp. v. Huber, 268
N.W.2d 593, 597 (N.D. 1978), the court limited the right to resort to a court action to situations in
which the developer had leases covering all of the coal. The holding was based on statutory
construction and was also supported, in the court's view, by the fact that forced pooling does not
exist in the context of coal mining in North Dakota, as it does for oil and gas production. Id.; see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (1980). The Surface Owner Protection Act, in the court's opinion,
"obviously was not intended to provide a forum for determining the extent that mineral interests
may, under all circumstances dominate surface interests. North Am. Coal Corp. v. Huber, 268
N.W.2d at 598.
172. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-07 (Supp. 1981).
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when he acquires the interest under an oil and gas lease, under
which he will pay a bonus consideration and royalty payments or
delay rentals, and then a second time when he must pay
compensation in order to extract the minerals even though he is
making only reasonably necessary use of the surface. 1
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If the compensation payments were destined for some general
fund for the public benefit there would probably be less chance for
successful constitutional challenge, as it would then be easier for a
court to find a valid exercise of the police power or some analogy to
taxation. The payments, however, are made to private persons, the
surface owners, who have no obligation to use the funds for any
kind of surface restoration or other environmental or public
purpose. Despite the stated purpose "to exercise the police power
of the state . . . to protect the public welfare,"'1 7  therefore, it is
really private individuals who benefit from the Act, except in the
general sense that agricultural production in the state might be
benefited.175 This kind of private purpose does not provide a
sufficient constitutional basis for the exercise of the police power
through statutes that require the prior consent of the surface owner
before minerals can be extracted. 176 Surely a cogent argument can
be made by analogy that the police power of the state does not
extend to requiring the mineral developer to compensate the
173. See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Surface Owner Consent Provisions in the Tennessee Surface
Mining Law and the West Virginia Oil and Gas Conservation Act, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 1385, 1389 (1980).
The constitutionality of the Surface Owner Protection Act, chapter 38-18 of the North Dakota
Century Code, was challenged in North American Coal Corp. v. Huber, 268 N.W.2d 593, 595
(N.D. 1978); however, the case was decided on issues of statutory construction and the constitutional
issues were not reached,
It is interesting to note that the Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act applies
even if the surface and mineral estates are not severed. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-02 (1980). The
lessor who also owns the surface is generally held to have waived, or assumed the risk of, reasonably
foreseeable surface damage. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. There may be a question,
therefore, whether the protection of the Act may be waived by the granting of a lease when the
mineral owner and the surface owner are the same person. The Surface Owner Protection Act, on
the other hand, expressly provides that the requirements for surface damage and disruption
payments may not be waived. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 38-18-07 (3 ) (Supp. 1981).
174. N.D. CENT. CODE S 38-11.1-01(1) (1972). The same language appears in the Surface
Owner Protection Act. Id. § 38-18-02(1).
175. The Act is also premised on protecting "the economic well-being of individuals engaged in
agricultural production." Id. S 38-11.1-01(1). Again, the Surface Owner Protection Act contains the
same language. Id. §38-18-02(l).
176. Department for Natural Resources & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8 Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684, 686
(Ky. Ct. App. 1975). The Kentucky court found there was no rational relationship between such a
private veto power and any goal of environmental protection. Id. One commentator summarized:
Though politically expedient, these requirements simply do not fall within the scope of
the police power. Consequently, they are arbitrary impositions upon the mineral
owner's and operator's rights to the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property,
violating the taking clause of the fifth amendment and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Note, supra note 173, at 1394. Constitutional problems raised by surface owner consent statutes are
discussed in Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 33
VAND. L. REv. 871, 907-17 (1980).
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surface owner, a private individual, when surface damages have
been caused by the developer's operations carried on without any
fault on his part in the traditional legal sense of negligence,
nuisance, or excessive use. The relationship between such private
right of compensation and the public welfare would seem to be
tenuous at best, particularly when the surface owner is under no
obligation to undertake any surface restoration or reclamation. 1
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It would be premature to speculate further on how the North
Dakota Supreme Court will deal with the Oil and Gas Production
Damage Compensation Act, as it surely must in the fairly near
future. The potential constitutional problems inherent in
construing section 38-11.1-04 of the North Dakota Century Code
as creating strict liability for surface damages without fault have
been pointed out above. 7 8 These problems are avoided by
construing sections 38-11.1-06 and ,38-11.1-04 together, as
suggested herein, to require the existence of a lack of ordinary care,
that is negligence, or nuisance before liability can arise. 179
In one trial court decision, Murphy v. Amoco Production Co., 180 in
which the surface owner sought damages under section 38-11.1-04
of the North Dakota Century Code and which was consolidated
with a separate action by the oil and gas developer seeking a
determination that the Act was unconstitutional, the court
implicitly took the view that sections 38-11.1-04 and 38-11.1-06
provide separate and distinct liability. 181 Citing the Hunt decision
the court noted that, apart from section 38-11.1-04, the lessee
"would have the right to enter upon and use the surface estate to
the extent necessary for development of the mineral estate" without
liability for surface damages caused by reasonably necessary use. 182
The court then held that section 38-11.1-04 of the North Dakota
177. Cf Note, supra note 173, at 1393. Under the Surface Owner Protection Act the coal
developer is in fact obligated to reclaim the surface, although this cost is above and beyond the
compensation paid to the surface owner. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-08 (1980). There is no
corresponding provision in the Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act, presumably
because oil and gas development does not normally affect large surface tracts in the way strip mining
of coal does. Under traditional principles and in the absence of express agreement, there is no
obligation on the part of an oil and gas developer to restore the surface after reasonable use. I
WitLIANS & MENERS, supra note 5, § 218.12; Sellers, How Dominant is the Dominant Estate? or, Surface
Damages Revisited, 13 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 377, 383-84 (1962): Comment, Land Uses
Permitted an Oil and Gas Lessee, 37 TEX. L. Rev. 889, 897-98 (1959). The North Dakota Industrial
Commission rules require "practical restoration of the well site" when a dry hole or abandoned well
is plugged. N.D. ADIMiN. CODE § 43-02-03-15 (1982). Restoration of the surface is also required on a
producing well site within a reasonable time after setting production casing. Id. § 43-02-03-19.
178. See supra notes 166-76 aid accompanying text.
179. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11. 1-04. -06 (1980).
180. Civ. Nos. 3614 & 3633 (S.W. Dist. N.D. Jan. 8, 1981) (consolidated for trial).
181. Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., Civ. Nos. 3614 & 3633, slip op. at 1-2. See N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 38-11.1-04, -06 (1980).
182. Civ. Nos. 3614 & 3633. slip op. at 2. "This could cause loss, such as to crops. but the
surface owner would not be compensated for any damage unless caused unnecessarily or ... because
of express agreement." Id.
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Century Code applied prospectively only, so that it had no bearing
on leases executed before July 1, 1979, such as the one in issue.
8 3
The constitutional challenge, therefore, was not reached. The court
did express the view that section 38-11.1-06, which it characterized
as simply restating existing law, constitutionally could be applied to
exploration and development after June 30, 1979.184 In discussing
section 38-11.1-04, however, which it viewed as establishing a kind
of statutory contractual liability 18 5 as opposed to the traditional tort
liability under section 38-11.1-06, the court seemed to have doubts
of its constitutionality, even when applied prospectively: "If there is
to be any chance at all of saving the legislation, it can only be by applying
it prospectively. '186
The constitutional problems inherent in imposing strict
liability by statute, therefore, appear to have been at least hinted at
by one court. It will be of great interest to observe the development
of the law in North Dakota as the courts are faced with the difficult
questions raised by the Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act. If the Act is to be construed liberally enough to
impose strict liability on the developer to compensate for all surface
damages, then the North Dakota Legislature has indeed embarked
upon uncharted and potentially troubled waters. If the intent on the
other hand was to clarify and codify existing law as exemplified by
the Hunt decision, that sections 38-11.1-04 and 38-11.1-06 of the
North Dakota Century Code must be read together, then North
Dakota remains within the mainstream in this area of the law. 187 In
183. Id. at 3, 5.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id. at 3. The Murphy court reasoned as follows:
Both the federal and state constitutions forbid the passage of laws which impair the
obligations of contracts. S 38-11.1-04, if applied retroactively, would clearly violate
these constitutional prohibitions by impairing the developer's contractual rights or, to
put it differently, by imposing contractual restrictions that did not exist prior to the
passage of the legislation. This is not an incidental result of the passage of the
legislation, but a direct result; indeed, the legislation was passed specifically for this
purpose.
Id.
186. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
187. See L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 59 (1968). The question of legislative intent is always
an elusive one, which can only rarely be fully ascertained by reference to legislative history. Professor
Fuller stated as follows:
The interpretation of statutes is, then, not simply a process of drawing out of the
statute what its maker put into it but is also in part, and in varying degrees, a process
of adjusting the statute to the implicit demands and values of the society to which it is
to be applied. In this sense it may be said that no enacted law ever comes from its
legislator wholly and fully "made."
Id. This does not reflect a failure in statutory draftsmanship, but simply reflects the nature of the
legislative process. A legislative body differs fundamentally from a court in that it is not required to
decide specific cases in specific situations:
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any case, one provision of the Act is laudatory and
noncontroversial. Section 38-11.1-05 mandates that the mineral
developer give the surface owner written notice of contemplated
drilling operations. 18 8 Surely one of the most effective ways to avoid
potential conflict between the mineral developer and the surface
owner would be to ensure that the latter is adequately informed in a
timely manner of the developer's drilling plans. 18 9 The goal should
always be peaceful coexistence, rather than hostile confrontation,
between the oil and gas developer and the surface owner.
VI. CONCLUSION
The nature of the ownership of severed oil and gas interests in
land is inherently permeated with the potential for conflict between
the oil and gas owner or developer and the surface owner. A
necessary concomitant of mineral ownership is that the law affords
its protection to the mineral owner to the extent reasonably
necessary to allow him to reap the benefits of his property by
producing the oil and gas by the usual and customary methods in
the industry. To say that he has this legally protected right is to say
that he is not required to make compensation to any private person,
For a legislature perhaps the pressures are such that a bill has to be passed dealing with
a certain subject. But the precise effect of the bill is not something upon which the
members have to reach agreement. If the legislature were a court, it would not decide
the precise effect until a specific fact situation arose demanding an answer .... It will
not be required to make the determination in any event, but can wait for the court to
do so .... The result is that even in a non-controversial atmosphere just exactly what
has been decided will not be clear.
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCrtON TO LEGAL REASONING 30-31 (1948) (footnote omitted). For this reason the
statutory language may reflect the goals and intent of the framers only incompletely and imperfectly.
This provides a basis for the court's duty to use its best.judgment in construing the language in the
light of actual fact situations. See E. BODENHEIMER,.JURISPRUDENCE 420 (rev. ed. 1974).
It would be somewhat premature, therefore, to speculate on what the precise legislative intent
was as to how the provisions of the Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act should
operate in practice. This will be for the North Dakota Supreme Court to establish as it deals with
cases arising under the Act.
188. N.D. Cent. Code § 38-11.1-05 (1980). The notice must sufficiently disclose the plan of
work to allow the surface owner to evaluate the effect of the drilling on his own use of the surface. Id.
The language of the section expressly excludes geophysical exploration under chapter 38-08.1 of the
North Dakota Century Code, which contains its own requirement to file notice with the county
commission. Id. § 38-08.1-04(Supp. 1981).
189. See Moses, Peaceful Coexistence Between Lessor and Lessee Under an Oil and Gas Lease, 38 TUL. L.
REV. 341, 359 (1964). Although there is generally no implied duty to give notice, voluntary notice is
beneficial to both parties, as one commentator observed:
Despite the holdings of the courts, common sense and prudence, as well as good
public relations, dictate that a cooperative and smart lessee would give timely notice of
his intent to move onto the property and conduct operations. It is quite true that such
a notice is not a "burden" placed upon the lessee under the terms of the typical lease.
Nevertheless, a wise lessee should not endanger what otherwise might be pleasant
relations with his lessor by failing to comply with this simple request.
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in particular the owner of the overlying surface, for reasonably
necessary surface damage or disruption caused by the extraction
process.1 90 In recent years courts have begun to stress, in addition
to the doctrine allowing reasonably necessary surface use, a
corollary to the effect that due regard must be accorded to the rights
of the surface owner. This has led to characterization of the
problem as requiring an accommodation between the rights of the
mineral developer and the surface owner when reasonable
alternative means exist by which the oil and gas can be produced
without surface damage, or at least with less damage. This doctrine
was elaborated in some detail by the North Dakota Supreme Court
in the 1979 Hunt case.
With the enactment of the Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act in North Dakota in 1979, a new element has
entered the scene. Whether the Act is fundamentally a codification
of existing law or whether it is an attempt to forge new safeguards
for the surface owner can be ascertained only after the North
Dakota Supreme Court has dealt with its ramifications. It is safe to
say that thorny constitutional issues will need to be resolved if trial
courts interpret the Act as imposing absolute liability without fault
upon the oil and gas owner for all damage or disruption caused by
exploration or production activities.
190. The mineral owner is required to compensate the state, in a sense, through the 61Y % oil
extraction tax imposed "upon the activity in this state of extracting oil from the earth." N.D. CENT.
CODE S 57-51.1-02 (Supp. 1981). The constitutionality of this tax was upheld in Sunbehm Gas, Inc.
v. Conrad, 310 N.W.2d 766, 770-71, 773 (N.D. 1981). The 5% oil and gas gross production tax
imposed by S 57-51-02 of the North Dakota Century Code is a tax on produced oil and gas, in lieu of
property tax, rather than a tax on the act of extraction. N.D. CENT. CODE S 57-51-02 (1972); see
Federal Land Bank v. State, 274 N.W.2d 580, 583 (N.D. 1979).
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